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ABSTRACT 
The emergence of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) as an economic superpower has 
become one of the most significant developments in world affairs in recent times. As the PRC 
has grown in economic significance, it seeks to translate this to all areas of its relationship 
with the rest of the world. Africa and African countries are a region where the PRC‘s 
involvement and engagement has elicits major consternation, especially from Western 
countries. However, this region, relative to its geographic and population size, natural 
endowments, and engagement with other regions and Western countries in particular, remains 
insignificant in the PRC‘s external relations.  
South Africa enjoys very good diplomatic relations with the PRC, disproportionate to its 
significance with regard to the PRC‘s quest for resource that fuels its phenomenal economic 
resurgence. South Africa and the PRC‘s relationship has, within a decade, grown in depth and 
complexity that supersedes despite major asymmetries between them. South Africa is the first 
developing and African country with which the PRC established a comprehensive strategic 
partnership. While the concept of a ‗strategic partnership‘ remains unclear in international 
relations, it conveys a relationship of significance and stature that supplements ordinary 
bilateral relationships, although the latter are better defined and binding than the former. 
Clearly, the Chinese government attaches great importance to its relationship with South 
Africa.  
The advent of democracy and a thriving pluralistic socio-economic and cultural society that is 
admired despite the challenges it faces, makes South Africa an exemplar and desirable 
partner. South Africa‘s international stature and role in the international system, matches the 
PRC‘s objectives in this regard, making South Africa a good foil for PRC. However, this 
study contends that there are reasons that are beyond the well-worn natural resource 
extraction and diplomacy arguments that make South Africa attractive to the PRC. It uses 
asymmetry theory of international relations to explore and elucidate this. It explores what 
underpins, motivates and accounts for the rapid progression of this relationship and the 
implications this may have on their relationship in the future   
This thesis uses Womack‘s (2001, 2003, 2003a, 2006, 2006a, 2010) terminology and 
methodology to look at how South Africa and the PRC concentrate on areas of 
complementarity and cooperation and seek and foster mutual understanding and appreciation 
of each other‘s societies and histories. The thesis explore how they work to actively convert 
hostility to friendship and adroitly manage the relationship to prevent it drifting from 
friendship to hostility, as well as using what Womack calls routinization, neutralization and 
diplomatic ritual, in managing their partnership.  
From the perspective of asymmetry theory, the PRC and South Africa are complementary. 
South Africa is the largest; most sophisticated, developed and diversified economy in Africa 
and the developing world. It possesses or has access to technical and managerial knowhow 
that the PRC would have difficulty accessing elsewhere. South Africa remains a strategic 
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maritime and naval route for the PRC‘s trade and accesses to key resources on the African 
continent and elsewhere.  
The study finds that asymmetry theory is useful in understanding how South Africa and the 
PRC manage their relationship. Asymmetry theory provides a framework to analyse the 
motivations and dynamic interactions that drive the progression of their diplomatic relations. 
The findings of the thesis imply a diplomatic relationship between South Africa and the PRC  
that is based on more than just the PRC‘s need for resources and diplomatic support in the 
international system. 
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Opsomming 
Die onlangse toetrede van die VolksRepubliek van China (VRC) tot die geledere van die 
ekonomiese supermoondhede het een van die mees beduidende verwikkelinge in 
wêreldaangeleenthede geword. Soos die VRC ekonomies belangriker geword het, is gepoog 
om hierdie sukses te herhaal op ander terreine van die land se buitelandse betrekkinge met die 
res van die wêreld. Afrika en Afrika lande is ‗n streek waar die VRC se betrokkenheid en 
verbindnisse groot konsternasie ontlok het, veral vanaf Westerse lande. Maar hierdie streek, 
relatief tot sy geografiese en demografiese grootte, natuurlike hulpbronne en betrokkenheid 
by ander streke en veral Westerse lande, bly onbeduidend in die VRC se buitelandse 
betrekkinge.  
Die aandag wat Suid Afrika van die VRC geniet is disproporsioneel in vergelyking met die 
belang van die VRC se soeke na hulpbronne om haar fenomenale ekonomiese groei te stook. 
Die verhoudinge tussen Suid-Afrika en die VRC het in die bestek van ‗n dekade gegroei in 
diepte en kompleksiteit wat als oorskadu ten spyte van groot ongelykhede tussen hulle. Suid-
Afrika is die eerste ontwikkelende land met wie die VRC ‗n omvattende strategiese 
vennootskap gesluit het. Terwyl die konsep van ‗n ‗strategiese vennootskap‘ onduidelik bly 
in internasionale betrekkinge, vergestalt dit betrekinge van beduidenis en statuur wat gewone 
bilatirale betrekkinge aanvul, alhoewel laasgenoemde beter gedefinieer en bindend is as 
eersgenoemde. Dit is duidelik dat die Chinese regering groot belang heg aan betrekkinge met 
Suid-Afrika  
Die oorgang na demokrasie en ‗n florerende plurale sosio-ekonomiese kulturele samelewing 
wat bewonder word ten spyte van die uitdagings wat dit in die gesig staar, maak van Suid-
Afrika ‗n navolgingswaardige en wenslike vennoot. Suid-Afrika se internasionale statuur en 
rol in die internasionale stelsel pas die VRC se doelwitte in hierdie opsig en maak van Suid-
Afrika ‗n goeie skerm floret vir die VRC. Maar, hierdie tesis betoog dat daar ook ander redes 
is buiten die wel bekende natuurlike hulpbron onttrekking en diplomatieke argumente wat 
Suid-Afrika vir die VRC aantreklik sou maak. Womack se ongelykheidsteorie in 
internasionale betrekkinge word gebruik om dit te ondersoek en toe te lig. 
Ongelykheidsteorie is nog nie voorheen in studies oor hierdie betrekkinge gebruik nie. 
Hierdie tesis verskaf dus ‗n belangrike alternatiewe metode om hierdie betrekkinge te 
bestudeer. 
Die tesis ondersoek Suid-Afrika en die VRC se betrekkinge na aanleiding van Womack 
(2001, 2003, 2003a, 2006, 2006a, 2010) se terminologie en metodologie en fokus op gebiede 
waar die twee lande mekaar komplimenteer en kan saamwerk; wedersydse verstaan van, en 
waardering vir, mekaar se mense en geskiedenisse kan koester; om aktief vyandigheid te 
omskep in vriendskap  en om verhoudings so bedrewe te bestuur  dat vriendskap nie in 
vyhandigheid verander nie; en om ook wat Womack roetiene, neutraliteit en diplomatieke 
ritueel noem te gebruik in die bestuur van hul vennootskap.  
Deur die lens van ongelykheidsteorie kyk die tesis na wat die vinnige progressie wat hierdie 
betrekkinge onderskraag, motiveer en verklaar. 
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Vanuit die perspektief van ongelykheidsteorie vind die VRC Suid-Afrika komplimenterend. 
Dit is die grootste, mees gesofistikeerde, ontwikkelde en gediversifiseerde ekonomie in 
Afrika en die ontwikkelende wêreld. Dit besit of het toegang tot tegniese en bestuurskennis 
wat die VRC moeilik elders toegang toe sou kon kry. Suid-Afrika bly ‗n strategiese maritime 
en vloot roete vir VRC handel en toegang tot sleutel hulpbronne op die Afrika kontinent en 
elders.  
Een van die bevindings van die studie is dat ongelykheidsteorie ‗n nuttige metode is om die 
bestuur van die verhouding tussen Suid-Afrika en die VRC te verstaan. 
Dit verskaf ‗n raamwerk vir die analise van die motiverings en dinamiese interaksies wat die 
vordering van hul diplomatieke betrekkinge bepaal. 
Die bevindings van die tesis impliseer dat die diplomatieke betrekkinge tussen Suid-Afrika en 
die VRC nie net op die VRC se behoefte aan bronne en diplomatieke steun in die 
internasionale stelsel gebaseer is nie. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and rationale 
According to Tian Xuejun (2013a), South Africa and the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) 
have a strong diplomatic relationship which is currently considered to be a comprehensive 
strategic partnership. It was upgraded to this level from an ordinary diplomatic relationship 
within a very short time compared to the time taken by the PRC to upgrade many of its other 
strategic partnerships. This raises the question whether this is an indication of a special 
relationship between them, especially in the context of the PRC‘s size, its relationship with 
other African countries with whom it has longer diplomatic ties and who are more endowed 
with  the natural resources it seeks.  
The relationship between the PRC and many African countries attracts disproportionate 
attention and is seen as controversial in relation to its ties to its major economic partners, for 
example, the Asian countries such as Australia and Japan, the European Union (EU) and the 
United States of America (US) (Swigonski, 2012). Edinger, Herman & Jansson (2008) argue 
that the PRC has the potential to become a future super power because it is already an 
economic giant, and its political influence is growing. As it continues to prosper 
economically and endeavours to enhance its political influence in global affairs, the PRC is 
fostering and strengthening its relationships with African countries. Many observers attribute 
the PRC‘s flourishing relationships with African countries to its need for the energy and raw 
materials from these countries to fuel its economic growth and for their political support, 
especially, in international multilateral forums  Alden,(2008a), Large (2008), Le Pere (2007), 
Shelton (2005), Taylor (2006), Wasserman (2012).   It is claimed that to this end the PRC is 
prepared to work with any government with no question asked (Alves, 2013 & Taylor, 2004). 
As a result, it is said, it consorts with undemocratic despots, strongmen and human rights 
abusers in Africa (Taylor (2006).  
This characterisation of the PRC‘s relationship with African countries downplays or ignores 
the long and enduring ties between them. This is largely a realist perspective of the 
relationship between the PRC and many African countries, regarded as serving the PRC‘s 
pursuit of power and its interests only (Alden, 2008a; Large 2008; Le Pere 2007; Shelton 
(2005). This characterisation is also applied in South Africa with the PRC (Rotberg, 2008; 
Lee & Shalom, 2008). South Africa is endowed with natural resources, found there 
predominantly and key to the PRC‘s economic output and growth such as coal, platinum and 
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iron. Furthermore, and it occupies an esteemed position in international affairs attested to by, 
for example, its occupation of a non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council 
ahead of other countries that may seem to be the logical choices (Alden & Schoeman, 2013). 
These are some of the attributes that make South Africa a desirable partner for countries such 
as the PRC with who it may appear to have little in common. 
South Africa is a democratic and pluralistic country which espouses human rights and 
guarantees many freedoms that the PRC is not known for advocating. The differences in 
values and norms should weigh against a natural partnership between them. A casual look 
shows them to be an asymmetric pair. The differences between them are stark. In the terms of 
size and scale on a number of broad measures, gargantuan PRC‘s dwarfs minnow South 
Africa as illustrated in Table 1.  
Table 1: Illustration of asymmetry between the PRC and South Africa: 
Comparison of a few key metrics 
 The PRC South Africa 
Population 1,355,692,576 (July 2014 
est.) 
48,375,645 (July 2014 est.) 
Government type  Socialist/Communist state Republic (democratic) 
Size of economy Second largest Twenty seventh 
GDP $8.939 trillion $353.9 billion (2013 est.) 
GDP - real growth rate 7.6% (2013 est.) 2% (2013 est.) 
Exports $2.21 trillion (2013 est.) $91.05 billion (2013 est.) 
Imports $1.772 trillion (2013 est.) $99.55 billion (2013 est.) 
Budget revenues: $2.064 trillion 
expenditures: $2.251 trillion 
(2013 est.) 
revenues: $88.53 billion 
expenditures: $105.5 billion 
(2013 est.)  
 
Military forces  2,285,000 (active),  
800,000 (reserve) 
 39,445 (active), 
 12,300 (reserve) 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency: The World Fact Book 
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Assessing South Africa‘s trade with the PRC, Sandrey et al (2013:1) concluded, in line with 
conventional wisdom, that South Africa is largely exporting raw materials and importing 
manufactured goods from the PRC. They also concluded that South Africa is not as important 
to the PRC as the PRC is to South Africa.  Furthermore, exports from other African countries 
are more important to the PRC than those from South Africa (Sandrey et al, 2013:4).This 
suggests great asymmetry between them and their relationship. 
Often, the PRC‘s relationships with African countries and South Africa in particular, is 
viewed and analysed only from the PRC‘s perspective (Alden, 2008 and 2008a; Alden & 
Hughes, 2009;  Alves, 2013;  Large, 2008; Taylor, 2006). However, as South Africa engages 
with the PRC voluntarily, it is just as important to understand why it pursues these 
partnerships with the PRC.  
Partnerships in international relations are arrangements between states designed to establish 
stable mutual relationships that do not create formal legal liabilities (Ng, 2013). Buckup 
(2012) characterise partnerships as a working relationship that is characterized by a shared 
sense of purpose, mutual respect and the willingness to negotiate‘ with the emphasis on the 
values and principles espoused by those in a partnership endeavour. Lister (2000: 228) 
identifies the following as being amongst the elements that should be present for a successful 
partnership;   
―mutual trust, complementary strengths, reciprocal accountability, joint decision- making and a two-
way exchange of information; clearly articulated goals, performance indicators and mechanisms to 
measure and monitor performance, clear delineation of responsibilities and a process for adjudicating 
disputes; mutual support and constructive advocacy; and long-term commitment to working together, 
recognition of other partnerships.‖  
The PRC was founded in 1949. Six years later, in 1955, the young state was one of the main 
instigators of the first Asia-Africa Conference, the Bandung Conference.  
The PRC sought to position itself against the Republic of China (henceforth referred to as 
Taiwan), and against the US (and its allies) and the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold 
War, and establish itself as a leader of the Third World and the nonaligned movement.  
According to Muekalia (2010: 6), ―China shared with these nations a sense of humiliation, 
the urge to restore dignity and a determination to take control of its own destiny. The leaders 
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present at Bandung sought to affirm their nations‘ independence from ‗Western imperialism‘ 
while keeping the Soviet Union at a distance‖.  
The PRC‘s diplomatic relations with African countries started the following year when Egypt 
became the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. The PRC‘s 
support of liberation movements ensured that the newly independent states established 
diplomatic ties with it. As a result, by the end of the1970s, 44 of the 50 independent African 
countries had entered into diplomatic relations with the PRC. These diplomatic relationships 
played a major role in the PRC‘s successful ouster of Taiwan as a member state of the United 
Nations (UN) and subsequently, other multilateral structures and forums.  
South Africa remained one of the few African countries to shun the PRC in favour of Taiwan 
until 1998. The apartheid South African government would not have diplomatic relations 
with a country it considered to be a socialist and/or communist country. This position 
weakened somewhat as the apartheid regime began informal contact with the PRC in 1991 
(Botha, 2008). The new government after 1994 espoused human rights and therefore had to 
reconcile itself to a relationship with a country charged with a questionable human rights 
record.  Taylor (2008) & Breslin & Taylor (2008) remind of the important role that human 
rights used to play in international relations amongst most countries with regard to the PRC 
before the ―made in‖ China label predominated. Furthermore, both Taiwan and apartheid 
South Africa were isolated after losing their respective seats at the UN and found solace in 
their mutually beneficial relationship (Mills & Baynham, 1994).  
After 1994, the new democratic South Africa, led by the African National Congress (ANC), 
which through the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC) already had ties with the PRC (the ANC itself was more aligned to the Union of 
Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) during the struggle years (Botha, 2008), had to contend 
with the legacy of the relationship with Taiwan. The relationship with Taiwan was very 
important for economic reasons and could not be broken off easily. The new South African 
government preferred having relations with both the PRC and Taiwan. However, in 1998 
South Africa took the difficult and long debated decision to establish diplomatic relations 
with the PRC, and due to the PRC‘s ―One China policy‖, it had to break off its diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan (Geldenhuys, 1995). Therefore, South Africa‘s diplomatic relationship 
with the PRC is very new, being only 15 years old,  and one of the least tested amongst 
African countries.  Yet, the PRC had within twelve years (1998 to 2010) elevated the bilateral 
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relationship from ordinary diplomatic ties, to a ―partnership‖ and then to a ―strategic 
partnership‖ and, in August 2010, to a ―comprehensive strategic partnership‖.  
South Africa is one of a few developing countries to be accorded a ―comprehensive strategic 
partnership‖ by the PRC, usually reserved for its biggest trading partners in the developed 
world. This hints at a phenomenal progress in the relationship and the significance placed on 
it. Each individual stage of the relationship has been analysed and commented upon (Qobo, 
2010, 2011, 2013; Alves & Sidiripoulus, 2013; Alden & Schoeman, 2013; Kabemba, 2012; 
Le Pere & Shelton, 2007 & Muekalia, 2004). However, little attention has been given to a 
comprehensive assessment of the progression of the relationship from one level to the next 
and the possible motives thereof. There is therefore an opportunity to understand what 
underpins and drives the partnership between South Africa and the PRC and explains its rapid 
progression.  
Amongst the attributes that are often forgotten in the study and analysis of this partnership 
and set it apart from others, especially in Africa, are the historic and cultural ties between the 
PRC and South Africa.  They include the existence of a significant native Chinese South 
African population and the PRC‘s support of the liberation movements in South Africa. 
Asymmetry theory places significance on mutual understanding and appreciation of each 
other‘s societies and histories. 
South Africa is one of a very few countries to have a significant native Chinese population 
and has the largest Chinese population in Africa,  dating back to the arrival of Cantonese  
traders in 1891, indentured labourers in 1904, and immigrants from China, Taiwan and 
Singapore in recent years (Yap & Leong Man, 1996; Accone, 2007 & Harris, 2007). With 
regard to the PRC‘s support for liberation movements, Alden and Aran (2012: 61) advocate 
for a greater recognition of the role of the relationship between political parties in 
international relationships.  They argue that political parties often determine the ideological 
orientation of foreign policy and that this often becomes the policy of the government. Thus 
an important aspect of the PRC-South African relationship is the relationship between the 
South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Shelton, 
2005) which has grown to encompass and has been taken over by the ANC (Mofokeng, 2011, 
Butler, 2012, Kane-Berman, 2013 & The Economist, 2013a). This was a major factor in 
South Africa‘s acceptance of the ―One China policy‖ which was a precondition for its 
diplomatic ties with the PRC and led to its breaking ties with Taiwan. Although, these non-
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governmental relationships are not officially sanctioned and also have challenging dynamics 
(Shen, 2009) they create familiarity and a level of comfort for South Africans and  Chinese, 
and through them, their respective countries; South Africa and the PRC in dealing with each 
other. They facilitate the diplomatic ties, trade and economic ties that foster and through 
which the partnerships are realised. 
It is true that for both the PRC and South Africa their relationship is new. However, the PRC 
has forged diplomatic relations with many countries around the world and in Africa 
especially, for a much longer period than South Africa has. In this sense and in this regard, 
South Africa is a novice while the PRC is a veteran. Therefore although the relationship 
between them is couched in the language of friendship, equality and mutual benefit, it is 
characterised by big asymmetries on most metrics, for example, size of their populations, size 
of their economies, the rates of economic growth as shown in Table 1, and global influence. 
Furthermore, the PRC has a clearly articulated strategy in its relationship with Africa which 
includes South Africa, published in 2006. The converse does not hold because South Africa 
and the rest of the other African countries do not have a PRC strategy. In a relationship 
between asymmetric states, asymmetry theory emphasises the importance of the smaller state 
taking the initiative.  It is therefore important that South Africa knows what it wants from its 
relationship with the PRC. It needs to understand the PRC well enough to know the rationale 
and objectives of its foreign policy in general and as it relates to it in particular. From its 
rhetoric, the PRC seeks a mutually beneficial engagement with South Africa. If this is true, it 
is for South Africa to ensure that the partnership lives up to the PRC‘s claim that it is based 
on ‗equality and mutual benefit.‘  
1.2 Literature review 
Most scholarship and commentary on the relationship between the PRC and African 
countries, including South Africa, maintain that  the PRC is mainly interested in their energy 
resources and raw materials to fuel its economic growth, as well as their political support in 
the international system (Alden, 2008a; Large, 2008; Le Pere, 2007; Shelton, 2005; Taylor, 
2006; Wasserman, 2012). This perspective gives pre-eminence to the PRC‘s national interest, 
i.e. endeavours to realise political, economic, military, social, cultural, etc. objectives and 
downplays the agency of its African diplomatic partners. It reduces them to pawns in the 
PRC‘s pursuit of power and its interests only (Alden, 2008a; Large, 2008; Le Pere, 2007; 
Shelton, 2005).   
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Rotberg, 2008; Lee & Shalom, 2008 and Sandrey, Mpitsa, Vermaak & de Beer (2013:1), 
attribute the PRC‘ quest for resources as it main rationale for its budding diplomatic ties with 
South Africa. Scholars such as Alden & Schoeman (2013) emphasise the political dimension 
of the relationship. These scholars, analysts and commentators draw attention to South 
Africa‘ apparent deference and deferral to the PRC‘s stance on numerous issues such as, its 
voting patterns when it occupied a non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security 
Council and its treatment of the Dalai Lama. 
This depiction, focusing on national interests, power and dominance is typical of most of the 
school of thought and theories of international relations. However, the international system is 
made up of states characterised by asymmetry and accommodation. They use diplomatic ties 
to manage their relationship in a system that has no supreme authority to guide and 
adjudicate. The larger and more powerful states make room for the smaller and weaker ones. 
Keohane (1969), amongst others, investigated and commented on how smaller states manage 
despite being overshadowed the larger ones. They either aligned themselves with the larger or 
joined forces with other smaller states to avoid being overwhelmed. This conceptualisation of 
the relationship and interaction between asymmetric states regards this asymmetry as a 
limitation that has to be overcome or mitigated.  
Brantly Womack‘s asymmetry theory offers an alternative conceptualisation of the 
diplomatic relationship between larger and more powerful states with the smaller and weaker 
ones (Womack, 2001, 2003, 2003a, 2006, 2006a, 2010). Asymmetry theory asserts that states 
in an asymmetric relationship are as similar actors, plus or minus the disparity in capacities, 
rather than actors whose interests and perceptions are shaped only by their relative positions. 
It emphasises complementarity and cooperation between them. The thesis applies asymmetry 
theory as an alternative to the mainstream, to explore how South Africa and the PRC, 
asymmetric states, manage and develop their diplomatic relationship, operationalized through 
―partnership.‖ 
Although the use of partnership is not new or unique to how South Africa and the PRC depict 
their diplomatic relationship (Kay, 200:15) the PRC displays a preference for it. Ng (2013) 
contends that the PRC‘s preference for partnership may be due to its flexibility and non-
binding nature. However, partnerships are long-term commitments that are honoured and 
adhered to. Their flexibility and non-binding nature necessitate considering of alternative 
managing and developing, as well as looking at them. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  8 
 
This thesis identifies asymmetry theory as an appropriate theoretical framework to explore 
the motives, development and the way how South Africa and the PRC manage their 
relationship, and applies it. 
 
1.3 Problem statement and focus 
Based on the apparent differences between them, there seems to be not enough reason why 
South Africa and the PRC‘s relationship should be anything other than an ordinary 
diplomatic tie. Yet, it has been elevated to a comprehensive strategic partnership, a status 
which until then the PRC had reserved for its diplomatic relationships with a select number of 
its major developed partners, within an uncharacteristically short period of time. This study 
enquires about the rationales for this. 
 
The main research question of this study is; what underpins and motivates the nature, scope 
and development of the relationship between South Africa and the PRC since the 
establishment of diplomatic ties from 1998 to 2013?  
 
The main question is broken down into four secondary questions; 
 What are the roots of the relationship? The study examines the history and context of 
the diplomatic relationship and how their respective broader foreign policies and 
relations inform their choices? 
 How has the relationship developed?  The study explores the form of the relationship 
and examines the changes that have characterised its progress and how this has 
affected their behaviour towards each other. 
 What are the prospects of the relationship? Informed by the preceding questions, the 
study examines how each partner benefits and can benefit from the partnership going 
forward. 
 Can asymmetry theory be useful as a theoretical framework for analysis to explore the 
roots and development of the relationship? 
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1.4 Conceptual and theoretical outline 
 
This study examines why, using asymmetry theory as an analytical framework, despite their 
differences (asymmetry), South Africa and  the PRC conduct their diplomatic relationship 
through ‗partnerships‘ and details the nature and development of these partnerships. 
 
1.4.1 Partnership 
 
Partnerships in international relations are legally non-binding agreements or arrangements 
used by states to coordinate their diplomatic relationships. Grevi (2008: 147) maintains that 
bilateral partnerships have always existed in parallel to multilateral frameworks. However, he 
points out that building closer and structured relations amongst global players in the form of 
strategic partnerships became more pronounced after 1990s following the rise of new global 
players such as Brazil, the PRC, and India whose role in international affairs has also risen. 
 
 It is important to note that this thesis does not seek to study the concept of ―partnership‖ and 
―strategy‖ which are not new, and in their colloquial senses refer to, in the case of 
partnership, two or more entities cooperating to derive mutual benefit (Kay, 200:15), and in 
the case of strategy, planning and organising an incursion against an opponent to prevail 
(Mohapatra, 2011), nor will it endeavour to provide an analysis of ‗strategic partnership‘ 
other than to locate it in the context of this thesis. The uses of strategy and partnership in 
international relations follow these colloquial definitions but imbued with contextual meaning 
and detail specific to in international relations. Kay (200:15) points out that while the notion 
of ―partnership‖ is not a new phenomenon in international relations, its pairing with 
―strategic‖ to form the concept of ―strategic partnership‖ to signify diplomatic and military 
relationships began in the 1990s when the US and USSR were discussing how to manage a 
post-cold war environment. 
What makes a partnership ―strategic‖? Renard (2001:6) identifies a number of attributes that 
make a relationship a strategic partnership; first, a strategic partnership must be com-
prehensive, in order to allow linkages and trade-offs between various policies. Second, it 
must be built upon reciprocity, short of which it cannot be deemed a partnership at all. Third, 
a strategic partnership has a strong empathic dimension, which means that both partners share 
a common understanding of their mutual values and objectives. Fourth, a strategic partnership 
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must be oriented towards the long-term, which is to say that it is not put into question by 
casual disputes. Finally, a strategic partnership must go beyond bilateral issues to tackle (with 
the potential to solve) regional and global challenges, because that is its true raison d‘être. 
The strategic partnerships in this sense go beyond bilateral relations and focus on the 
instrumentalisation of this bilateral relationship for broader ends (i.e. regional or, better, 
global goals). The bilateral relationship per se is not the core ―finalité‖ of the strategic 
partnership, although the depth and the quality of the bilateral relationship obviously 
determine the potential of the strategic partnership, and therefore the former remains crucially 
important to the latter (Renard, 2001:5).  
Strategic partnerships in international relations are located in alliance theory. Walt (1987:12) 
defines an alliance as ―a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between 
two or more sovereign states" while  Snyder (1990:104) says "alliances ... are formal 
associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security 
or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states..." Walt (1989: 4) 
argues that although several motives can be identified, the principal reason to form an 
alliance is to balance against an external threat. The rationale for this tendency is 
straightforward: in the anarchic world of international politics, where no supreme authority 
exists to protect states from each other, states facing an external threat will join forces with 
others in order to amass sufficient power to deter or defeat an attack. 
Strategic partnerships fit into realist conceptions of international relations theory, particularly 
the relationship between offensive and defensive state strategies. To offensive realists, 
strategic partnerships as utilized by the United States are consistent with the notion of 
international primacy. A strategic partnership can be understood as a tool used by a powerful 
state, or states, to maximize political, economic, and military dominance in the international 
system. Strategic partnerships are thus a means of shaping the international environment to 
suit a state's vital interests (Kay, 2000: 16). Kay says that they allow for flexible bilateral 
relationships. 
Mao Weizhun (2012) maintains that partnership has cultural significance. Partnerships should 
be based on common values. Without common values, strategic partnerships which are only 
based on the interests will lead to utilitarian interactions. Once the interests change, this kind 
of strategic partnership will be very fragile. Common interests are the basic conditions of the 
existence of strategic partnership. However, too much emphasis on such interests will lead to 
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the ignorance of other factors, and will particularly lead to ignorance of the importance of 
common values in maintaining the relationship. Mao Weizhun says there are five standards 
for strategic partners: common interests, common values, influences, leverage and strengths. 
This is the main obstacle to build an intensive network of strategic partnerships. Goldstein 
(2003: 98) argues that whatever other adjectives are used to label these relationships (e.g., 
constructive or cooperative) ―strategic‖ is the key adjective. Though the PRC uses the 
―partnership‖ label for good relations with smaller states, it reserves the term ―strategic 
partnership‖ to define a ―new way of handling relations between major countries in the post-
cold war era.‖ Grevi (2012: 7) says that partnerships are strategic when they pursue 
objectives that go beyond purely bilateral issues and help foster international cooperation. 
The basic elements of a real strategic partnership include comprehensiveness, reciprocity, 
empathy and normative proximity, duration and the ambition to reach beyond bilateral issues. 
Strategic partnership should be selective adhering to co-operation and growth that serve the 
partners‘ core national interests (Grevi, 2012: 10). Real-life strategic partnerships are multi-
purpose ones, pursuing both bilateral and multilateral objectives and shifting focus across 
these and other dimensions of the relationship in a fairly pragmatic way. The ability to do so 
represents a key benchmark of their efficacy. Testing strategic partnerships means, therefore, 
dissecting their multiple functions as a foreign policy tool, thereby delivering a more 
sophisticated picture (Grevi, 2012: 12). 
Although the concept of ‗strategic partnership‖ in international relations has been in use for 
some times, it is relatively new in the international diplomatic lexicon.  It is not yet well-
defined, explained and consistently applied (Panda, 2013). It, therefore, means different 
things to different people and may even be used by the same people differently in different 
contexts. Yet, strategic partnerships are a growing mechanism by which states choose to 
officially define and conduct their relationships. Thus strategic partnerships are a key 
component of the foreign policy of many states today. 
1.4.2 Asymmetry theory 
Asymmetry theory is taken from the work of Brantly Womack who studied the relationship 
between the PRC and a number of its smaller Asian neighbours (Womack, 2001, 2003, 
2003a, 2006, 2006a, 2010). He maintains that the great disparities in endowments and 
capacities between larger countries and smaller ones create an asymmetric framework that 
shapes their relationships (Womack (2004:351). 
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Asymmetry theory asserts that states in an asymmetric relationship are similar actors, rather 
than actors whose interests and perceptions are shaped only by their relative positions. It 
emphasises complementarity and cooperation between them. The thesis will expand on 
asymmetry theory as an analytical framework in section 2.7. 
 
The thesis draws on and applies the perspectives of the work of Brantly Womack on 
asymmetry theory of international relations on the relationship between South Arica and the 
PRC, which to the author‘s knowledge has not been done before.  It explores why the 
relationship endures and concludes by highlighting its possible future trajectory and the 
opportunities this presents for South Africa. 
  
1.5 Research design and methodology 
One of the major challenges inherent in the study of foreign policy, international relations in 
general, and a diplomatic partnership in particular, between countries, is that these 
relationships are dynamic, public and open, and private and opaque at the same time. Official 
policies and agreements are shared and made publicly available. Yet, most important in these 
relationships are the motives, attitudes, understandings, strategies and tactics that are 
employed but not deliberately revealed. This is not necessarily clandestine. It is for this 
reason that countries develop diplomatic ties, to remove the need for having to manage all 
their engagements through official treaties, public pronouncements and transparent means 
that may attract attention and or jeopardise the relationship (Adler, 1997; Cox, 1983; 
Keohane, 1969, 1982, 1989; Mearsheimer, 2002; Wendt, 1992 & 1994).     
Thus in studying foreign policy and international relations, it is important to distinguish 
between the rhetoric and the reality. This is not always easy because the reality is often 
defined and or confined by the rhetoric. Ultimately, what is said in official and unofficial 
settings, as well as what is done, is what gives meaning to these relationships. For this reason, 
this study looks at official and unofficial statements and developments such as those 
presented by official conferences or interviews, from the perspectives of the main players 
(heads of states, diplomats, policy makers, etc.) and independent analysts and observers. This 
is why the study uses a qualitative descriptive and explanatory design nested in the 
interpretative social research paradigm which is characterised by the quest for exploration, 
description and explanation (Babbie and Mouton, 2007: 79). Babbie and Mouton (2007: 33) 
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posit that the ―emphasis is on interpretive understanding (verstehen) rather that causal and 
nomothetic explanation in terms of universally valid laws.‖ This contrasts with the 
quantitative paradigm of social research which focuses on the quantification of constructs, the 
uses of variables in describing and analysing human behaviour and the control of the sources 
of error in the research (Babbie and Mouton (2007: 49) 
The qualitative method is chosen for this study as it facilitates an interrogation of secondary 
and primary resources to gain in-depth understanding of the relationships and their context. 
(Babbie and Mouton, 2007: 270). The researcher focuses on descriptive data based on the 
observations of participants such as foreign relations officials and diplomats and document 
analysis within their particular settings and contexts. While the relationship between South 
Africa and the PRC is not unique in international relations, it is very particular to them and 
the context in which it takes place. While views and comments on the relationship by 
scholars, analysts, foreign relations officials and diplomats   do not necessarily reflect the 
reality of the protagonists‘ actions and behaviours, they give a good indication of the motives 
and intentions which inform the reality. 
Leedy (1993: 141) says that qualitative research focuses on analysis and synthesis. The 
qualitative researcher endeavours to have a complete and comprehensive view of what is 
being studied. This requires an understanding of the meaning that the main characters attach 
to events in their environment (Leedy, 1993: 144). In this study the characters are South 
Africa and the PRC, their representatives and independent observers and analysts who 
independently study and provide informed and objectives analysis of the relationship. These 
role players in international relations are believed to be representative of a sufficiently 
informed and broad perspective to give a full picture of subject matter being investigated.  
This study is descriptive in that it strives to present a detailed picture of the relationship 
between South Africa and the PRC, how it has developed since it was established. It is 
explanatory because looks at some of the possible motives and rationales for the relationship 
and the speed of its progression.  
The descriptive part of the research relies on observation and description, and the explanatory 
study looks at some of the drivers (Leedy, 1993:187 & Babbie and Mouton, 2007: 80) of the 
relationship between these two countries.  Leedy (1993: 187) says that the descriptive 
research method deals with a situation that demands the technique of observation as the 
principal means of collecting data. The data must then be organised and presented 
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systematically so that valid and accurate conclusions can be made. This requires detailed 
observation and rich and nuanced interpretation. Leedy warns though that data in descriptive 
study are particularly susceptible to distortion through the introduction of bias and therefore 
require vigilance to avoid it. 
This qualitative study depends on the use of secondary sources through the exploration of 
relevant academic journals, books, conference papers, papers and other publications such as 
credible internet and media sources, and primary data in the form of official policy 
documents, official and official public statements and comments by policy makes and 
diplomats in their official capacity, as the basis for the analysis. This includes the views and 
experiences of those who give effect to these diplomatic partnerships; i.e. the diplomats and 
policy makers 
The units of analysis for this study are the individual ―partnership‖ communiqués or 
declarations and the levels of analysis are the partners, South Africa and the PRC. (Singer, 
1961 & Yurdusev, 1993) 
The diplomatic relationship and partnerships between South Africa and the PRC are 
documented in specific communiqués or declarations which clearly set out their agreements, 
intentions, undertakings and programmes envisaged.  Some of the communiqués or 
declarations are preceded by joint statements that report on the progress made regarding 
previous commitments and towards reaching the next level in the relationship. 
1.6 Limitations 
There is a dearth of empirical work on the concept of strategic partnerships in international 
relations, and the strategic partnership between South Africa and the PRC in particular. There 
is also a dearth of literature and scholarly work that uses asymmetry theory to explore their 
partnership.  This is the reason why this study was undertaken. The study uses secondary data 
that focuses mostly on the bilateral relationship without paying specific attention to its 
motives and progress. The use of predominantly secondary data gives rise to reliance on the 
choice and number of sources. This introduces selection bias and overgeneralised 
interpretation that may make conclusions less robust. 
The nature of strategic partnerships as addressed in this study is not generalizable as the focus 
was not on comparing and distilling their essence from the PRC‘s relationships with other 
countries. 
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The study relies heavily on secondary sources although a concerted effort was made to use 
primary contributions even if it is through secondary reporting, for example, direct quotes, of 
heads of state and diplomats, scholars and analysts, etc., in media reports. It is acknowledged 
that the study could have benefited from interviews or surveys on the roots and practice of 
diplomatic relationships between South Africa and the PRC amongst their respective 
diplomatic corps. Limitations with regard to time to conduct the study and availability of the 
officials have resulted in primary data being restricted to the official statements and 
communiqué of the improvements of the partnerships.    The use of official considered and 
vetted declarations statements and comments in media, official functions, conferences and 
workshops, although they maybe contrived in that they present perspectives that the 
governments wish to project that may not be a true reflection the real motives and objectives, 
makes up for this because what is officially made public is what they can be held accountable 
for. 
The study is based mostly on secondary literature and existing scholarship. This consists 
mostly of the observations and analysis of Western Sino-African and South African experts, 
and English language sources. Chinese perspectives in Mandarin were not readily accessible 
or were used in translation. The predominance of a select and prolific number of Western 
Sino-African experts, who are aware of and cite each other‘s work, compounds the scope for 
bias and conformity. To mitigate this, Chinese sources such as China Daily, People‘s Daily 
and Xinhua were used, although they may not be considered independent because they are 
state owned (Smith, 2012). Their perceived lack of independence inadvertently makes them 
useful in that they provide the official Chinese perspective. They are also a source of the 
views of Chinese experts and commentators in academia and think tanks. Alternative Chinese 
perspectives from Taiwan and Hong Kong were derived from sources such as The Southern 
Metropolitan Daily and Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 
1.7 Delimitations 
This study is not a commentary on or an evaluation of the diplomatic relationship between 
South Africa and the PRC which is dynamic and complex and beyond its scope. It is confined 
to examining information that is in the public domain and statements by officials tasked with 
projecting a desired image that may not necessarily be the reality. 
 It focuses on the partnership as it has developed from 1998 to 2013 between the two 
countries. It does not focus on comparisons of their partnerships with other countries. It is not 
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the purpose of this thesis to study partnerships. The concepts of a ‗partnership‘ and ‗strategic 
partnership‘ are not the main focus of the study, although they are explained and 
contextualised for its purposes.  
Womack‘s asymmetry theory is used to analyse the partnership. It presents a fresh approach 
of studying and analysing relations between larger and smaller states. However, it is not 
tested. It is a new theory which has not been studied widely by researchers and scholars of 
international relations. 
1.8 Thesis outline  
Chapter 1. In this chapter the introduction, rationale, research problem, research method, data 
collection, analysis and limitation and delimitations of the study are provided. 
Chapter 2.  This chapter provides a review of the mainstream theoretical concepts that 
underpin international relations studies such as realism, liberalism, critical theory, 
constructivism neo-gramscianism and asymmetry theory.  It focuses on asymmetry theory as 
it provides a template for understanding and analysing how smaller and larger states manage 
their relationship their asymmetry notwithstanding. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the characteristics of the relationship between the PRC and South 
Africa‘s and its distinguishing features such as their respective histories, foreign policies, 
status and stature in the international system. It presents the comments of officials and the 
opinion and analysis of research experts and scholars. Areas where the features of asymmetry 
theory are apparent are highlighted. 
Chapter 4. In this chapter the different phases in the relationship between South Africa and 
the PRC presented through the official communiqués and statements used to formalise them.  
Asymmetry theory is used for the analysis.  
Chapter 5 revisits the research questions and interprets the overall findings and draws 
conclusions on them. It provides the implications of these finding on the relationship between 
South Africa and the PRC and the lessons for international relations in general, and makes 
suggestions on areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores a number of schools of thought and theories of international relations 
briefly. The nature and merits of each theory will be briefly outlined in turn in order to 
establish the choice of theory that is used for this study. 
This approach acknowledges that although the different theories and strands in international 
relations have their adherents, they are not opposites or competitors but are complementary 
and even companions. None explains international relations completely and exclusively. 
Theory is contingent and not standalone. The choice of theory or tool for analysis depends on 
the context, the objective and the era.  Cox (1981: 128) states this succinctly saying, ―Theory 
is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives 
derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space‖. 
This partly explains the emergence and rise over time of different schools of thought and 
theories such as realism, liberalism, the critical school, constructivism, neo-Gramscianism, 
and, more recently, asymmetry theory, in the study of international relations. 
This chapter provides a brief analysis of the major schools of thought and theories of 
international relations to locate and introduce asymmetry theory as the basis of analysis of the 
relationship between South Africa and the PRC. 
2.2 Realism in international relations  
Realism is predicated on the assumptions that states are self-interested, rational actors 
seeking to survive while increasing their material conditions and, that uncertainty pervades 
relations between countries (Mearsheimer, 2002). Thomas Hobbes, Niccolo Machiavelli, 
Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr are credited with engendering the view that human 
nature predisposes individuals and states to be egoistic rational actors whose primary focus 
are harnessing political power for self-preservation (Wendt, 1992:395). According to 
Kenneth Walt (997: 932-933), Hans Morgenthau assumes that competition between states 
arises from the human lust for power (which he termed the animus dominandi). , Waltz 
ignores human nature and assumes that states merely aim to survive (Morgenthau 1946, 
Waltz 1979). "Offensive" realists, such as Mearsheimer (1994-95), argue that great powers 
seek to maximize security by maximizing their relative power. "Defensive" realists, such as 
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Jack Snyder (1991) or Charles Glaser (1994-95), argue that great powers are generally more 
secure when they refrain from power maximization and seek to defend the status quo.   
While realists may disagree about the relative importance of domestic versus systems-level 
causes, the relative stability of bipolar versus multipolar worlds, and the importance of 
intentions in shaping the calculations of national leaders, amongst others, they share the view 
that each state should act on the basis of caution and concern about the other states and their 
intentions (Walt,1997). This arises from the fact that states are sovereign and thus 
autonomous of each other; there is no inherent structure or society that exists or can emerge 
to order relations between them (Mearsheimer, 2006). They are bound only by forces flowing 
from coercion or their own consent (Slaughter, 2011). Mearsheimer (2006: 160) maintains 
that ―in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call when trouble comes 
knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a 
system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals.‖ Hence, power, 
competition and conflict are the dominant characteristics of international relations in the 
realism paradigm.  
This view accounts for the emphasis on states as the dominant players in an anarchic 
international political system, interested mostly in maximising their power through war if 
necessary. It is a view of a world dominated by great military powers. However, the reality is 
that the world incorporates all countries, great and small and many other actors in between. 
Therefore, there has been a growing recognition that although states, especially the strongest 
ones, are important players in international relations, they are not the only ones and security 
and the maximisation of power is not the sine qua non of international politics. This is 
epitomised by the legal precept of jus ad bellum – ―the right to war‖ defining the acceptable 
limits on the exercise of military power in international relations and law, especially of the 
strong against the weak. One of the most important principles underlying jus ad bellum is that 
military action must not be pursued for narrowly defined national interests only (Wallace & 
Martin-Ortega, 2013). 
2.3 The liberal school 
Philosophers of the Enlightenment such as Immanuel Kant, John Locke, and Adam Smith are 
some of the major thinkers recognised as the originators of liberalism. The core assumptions 
of liberalism are centred on the primacy of the individual, political freedoms and rights, 
private property and equality of opportunity, and hold that that even though states are self-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  19 
 
interested and self-centred they can cooperate and realise peace. With regard to international 
relations, Andrew Moravcsik (1993), for example, has developed a liberal theory based on 
three core assumptions: (i) individuals and private groups, not states, are the fundamental 
actors in world politics; (ii) states represent some dominant subset of domestic society, whose 
interests they serve; and (iii) the configuration of these interests across the international 
system determines state behaviour. This is affirmation that the national characteristics of 
individual states matter for their international relations (Slaughter (2011). Therefore, the 
domestic characteristics of individual states matter. They inform, influence and constrain the 
interplay of their socially based choices and actions with regard to distribution of power and 
the role of the economy amongst them.  
Modern liberal international relations theorists such as Robert Keohane (1989) and Joseph 
Nye (2004) emphasise the role of cooperation between states, multilateralism, and 
international institutions in fostering a stable international order. However, liberalism 
generally remains associated with the primacy of the individual, especially in the political and 
economic realm, and privileges the individual‗s highest utility within a market and capitalist 
economy and limits the role of government and the state. This raises the untenable spectre of 
the domination and exploitation of some individuals and nations by others. 
 2.4 The critical school 
The critical paradigm in international relations is a set of theories that are broadly founded on 
the writings of Karl Marx, especially with regard to how the primacy of individuals in a 
market and capitalistic economic order, as espoused by realism and liberalism, lead to the 
domination and exploitation of the majority in society by the few individuals who amass and 
control capital. This translates into the domination of the smaller states or powers by the 
larger ones in the context of international relations. These theories seek to explain 
international relations by focusing on the interests and behaviours of capital and how these 
influence state interests and behaviours (Cox, 1983 & Sinclair, 1996). Marxist theorists 
emphasise the role of social relations, and the associated economic and material aspects that 
underpin the international relations system. Although capital is important in the relations 
between states it is not the sine qua non of international relations, which is characterised by 
many actors and divergent motivations that inform them. The critical school recognises the 
role of these actors and divergent motivations in international relations. 
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2.5 Constructivism 
Constructivism in international relations characterises the international system as a product of 
human consciousness, human creation, human intervention and human invention and not only 
a product of material and objective forces (Wendt, 1992, 1994). Constructivism emphasises 
human agency. According to Wendt (1992: 396-397), 
 ―a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, 
including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act 
differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and 
friends are not. ------ It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize 
our actions.‖ 
 For Wendt (1994), constructivism focuses on the social context in which international 
relations occur with emphasis on issues of identity and belief. It postulates that the meanings 
in terms of which action is organized arise out of interaction (Wendt, 1992:403). He says that 
―constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following 
core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) 
the key structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; and (3) state 
identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than 
given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics (Wendt, 1994:385). 
He posits that corporate identity of states generates four basic interests or appetites; (a) 
physical security, including its differentiation from other actors; (b) ontological security or 
predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities; 
(c) recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through brute force, and  (d) 
development, in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states 
are repositories at the collective level Wendt (1994: 385). 
Slaughter (2011) posits that constructivism is not a theory but an ontology that represents a 
set of assumptions about the world and human motivation and agency.  Adler (1997: 323) has 
argued that constructivism is not a theory of politics and ―is not anti-liberal or anti- realist by 
ideological conviction; neither is it pessimistic or optimistic by design. He maintains that 
constructivism ―is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped 
by human action and interaction depends on the dynamic normative and epistemic 
interpretations of the material world.‖ This emphasises the centrality of human actors and 
their interactions in shaping international relations. 
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In the international system, this highlights the view that states and the relationships between 
them are not defined by nature but by people‘s shared perceptions, experiences, values, ideas, 
and understanding about themselves and their cultural, political, economic, etc. institutions 
(Wendt, 1994: 385).  Thus, the beginning or original condition in the relationship between 
states is not enmity and the desire to annihilate the other to ensure one‘s survival. States 
acknowledge each other‘s right to be. This acknowledgement necessitates an appropriate 
mode and mechanism of engagement and interaction between them. This in turn informs how 
they relate.  
The reality remains that humans and their nature and the nature of their social and historical 
interactions are significant aspects of international relations and world politics. This partly 
explains the rise of Neo-Gramscianism in the study of international relations.  Neo-
Gramscianism recognises this as it focuses on the interaction of key variables such as the 
state and non-state actors, specific social milieu, and prevailing global governance and 
relational paradigm. It highlights and espouses the important role that context and ideology 
play in how countries relate to one another and provides a rationale for the relationship 
between different and unequal countries. 
2.6 Neo-Gramscianism  
Neo-Gramscianism is an emerging theory in the study and analysis of international relations.  
It is closely associated with Robert Cox, who imported and applied Antonio Gramsci‘ ideas 
to international relations in a seminal 1983 article titled ―Gramsci, Hegemony and 
International Relations: An Essay in Method.‖ Although Neo-Gramscianism is heavily 
influenced by the writings of Antonio Gramsci from whom it gets its name, it diverges from 
them and evolves as a distinct theory (Fusaro, 2010).  
It emphasises broad and interdisciplinary study and analysis of society at the domestic level, 
and states at the international level, and the interplay between them. However, Neo-
Gramscianism is not a synthesis of the other theories of international relations, but, because it 
integrates many dimensions such as ideas at the individual level, the nature and capabilities 
of states, and the tools of social, economic, and natural sciences, it covers substantial ground 
covered by the other theories of international relations. It is the context that gives it a slant to 
any particular theory, i.e., realism, liberalism, constructivism, etc. For instance, Fusaro (2010) 
argues that Gramsci presents an analysis closer to Lenin‘s ―imperialism‖ and to a lesser 
extent to the realist school.  
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The crux of Neo-Gramscianism is the conceptualisation of hegemony in the international 
political arena as power emanating from a confluence of coercion and consent. Cooper (2002) 
argues this well maintaining that the  
‖raison d'ètat and the amorality of Machiavelli's theories of statecraft, which defined international 
relations in the modern era, especially realism, have been replaced by a moral consciousness that 
applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs.‖ 
Unfortunately, Cooper applies this only to what he calls postmodern continent of Europe and 
advocates a reversion to what he calls the rougher methods of an earlier era, ―force, pre-
emptive attack and deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the 
nineteenth century world of every state for itself.‖ The postmodern states would keep the law 
but when operating in the ―jungle,‖ they would use ―the laws of the jungle.‖ This 
paradoxically would limit its applicability contrary to his intention. Applied broadly, 
Cooper‘s argument resonates with neo-Gramscianism. 
Fusaro (2010: 3) claims that Gramsci‘s understanding of power is exemplified by the 
comparison with a centaur: half man, half beast and hence, power as a necessary combination 
of consent and coercion. Hegemony prevails, Cox argues, when the consensual aspect of 
power is in the forefront. Because hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of behaviour in 
most people most of the time, coercion will be mainly latent and used only in particular, 
deviant situations.‖ Therefore the need for military capability remains. However, it must be 
available to address the ―deviant situations‖ and protect the status quo or as Cooper (2002) 
puts it ―the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world. A world in 
which the efficient and well governed export stability and liberty, and which is open for 
investment and growth - all of this seems eminently desirable.‖ 
Neo-Gramscianism extends the concept of hegemony beyond the bounds of economic and 
military power. Qobo (2010:15), referring to the work of Chris Brown, maintains that, ―the 
importance of a hegemon lies in providing stability and creating rules or institutions that may 
in future render the existence of a hegemon unnecessary.‖  In this environment, rules and 
institutions replace economic and military power. Qobo argues that the concept of hegemon 
is value free. A hegemon can have a good influence as well as a bad one.   
As is already indicated, Neo-Gramscianism avers that modern states no longer behave 
predominantly through the Machiavellian principles and raison d’état (Cooper, 2002). 
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Cooper (2002) presents this as characteristic of what he calls a postmodern international 
order that is marked by;  
• The breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. 
• Mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance. 
• The rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of self-
enforced rules of behaviour. 
• The growing irrelevance of borders: this has come about both through the changing role of 
the state, but also through missiles, motor cars and satellites. 
• Security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual 
vulnerability. 
This characterises a postmodern world which, although Cooper (2002) associates mostly with 
Europe, is one whose conception of relations amongst nations focuses on the social, 
universalistic, moralistic aspects of hegemony rather than those of the raw military power of 
the great powers. 
This recognition drives the interest in new tools in the study and analysis of international 
relations such as asymmetry theory advocated by Brantly Womack based on his study of 
several asymmetric bilateral relationships in the last decade.  
2.7 Asymmetry theory 
2.7.1 Introduction to asymmetry theory 
Asymmetry theory arose out of Womack‘s study and insights on the relationship between the 
PRC and a number of its smaller Asian neighbours such as Vietnam and Cambodia 
(Womack, 2001, 2003, 2003a, 2006, 2006a, 2010). He argues that although multipolarity 
emphasises international cooperation and militates against the superpower‘s capacity for 
domination it does not address the real problems created by the disparity of power in 
international affairs (Womack (2004:351). The great disparities in capacities between larger 
countries such as the PRC and smaller ones such as Vietnam and Cambodia create an 
asymmetric framework that shaped every aspect and every phase of the relationship 
(Womack, 2004:351). Womack (2004:351) maintains that,  
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―Asymmetry theory is a new paradigm that addresses the effects of national disparities on 
international relations. It argues that asymmetry inevitably creates differences in risk perception, 
attention and interactive behavior between states, and that it can lead to a vicious circle of systemic 
misperception. Despite such tensions, however, the international order is quite stable, and even 
asymmetric relations can rarely be forced by the stronger side. Asymmetry confirms multipolarity‘s 
critique of unipolarity‘s exaggerated claim to absolute power, and suggests a theory of international 
leadership based on negotiated relationships that avoid the systemic misperceptions that asymmetry 
encourages‖ 
Although he maintains that asymmetry is new, Womack acknowledges that it shares elements 
with other theories of international relations. Asymmetry theory assumes that capacities 
matter and that states attempt to maximize their interests in common with realism (Womack 
2006a: 18). It emphasises the role of perception and interaction in the relationship between 
states in line with constructivism.  He argues that asymmetry theory differs from most 
international relations theories in that it does not assume that relative power implies control 
by the larger powerful states of the smaller and weaker or absolute helplessness of the smaller 
and weaker in relation to the larger powerful states (Womack, 2006a: 20). The more powerful 
states (countries) cannot arbitrarily impose their will on less the powerful Womack (2004: 
360). 
For example, the PRC could use its size, stature and capacities to overwhelm its neighbours 
but it does not, at least not overtly. The regional geopolitics of South East Asian, especially 
the interests and presence of the US, partly accounts for the PRC‘s caution in dealing with its 
neighbours but it is not the only reason. There is a symbiotic relationship between the PRC 
and its neighbours. Womack realised that their asymmetric endowments are a positive 
attribute of their relationship.  This suggested asymmetry is possible framework in assessing 
foreign relations and policies in the international political arena in a time where most 
international relationships are asymmetric. 
Womack‘s asymmetry theory assumes that although states endeavour to maximise their 
national interests they recognise and utilise the different capacities of others (Womack, 2001, 
2003, 2003a, 2004, 2006). The maximisation of national interests if taken at face value as 
advocated by other theories such as realism and liberalism, would entail the domination of 
the smaller and weaker by the larger and stronger states in international relations, as most 
theories equate asymmetry to imbalance of capacities and power that leads to a 
disequilibrium that creates either subordination or a competition for domination (Firsing, 
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2010: 27) This would be the political equivalent of a Darwinian struggle where the larger and 
stronger countries prevail and smaller, weaker ones become extinct. In reality, in the post- 
colonial and post-imperial era, larger and stronger countries do not annex and subjugate the 
smaller weaker ones. Furthermore, the smaller, weaker countries do not totally subject 
themselves to the stronger countries nor do they die out.  The larger and stronger countries 
and smaller, weaker ones coexist and partner, and find ways to collaborate and accommodate 
each other. Moreover, competition ceases to be the dominant feature of their relationship 
because as Wendt (1992: 415) so succinctly puts it, ―I have no interest in exploiting my 
friends, not because of the relative costs and benefits of such action but because they are my 
friends‖  
Scot Firsing (2012) is amongst a few scholars to apply asymmetry theory in the study of the 
relationship between states. It is the nature of states to be conscious of and to recognise their 
own sovereignty and those of others, regardless of size or status,  and not to violate the 
territorial rights of others without ―just cause‖ (Wendt,1992: 414). Therefore, states make 
room for each other, especially the larger for the smaller. The larger state recognises the 
autonomy of the smaller and the smaller accords the larger appropriate deference Womack 
(2010: 85). 
Keohane (1969: 301), citing Rothstein, has argued that smaller powers, in the first instance 
and especially for security and political reasons; seek mixed, multilateral alliances failing 
which they settle for bilateral alliances even if they are unequal. These alliances are with 
other smaller powers, but more often than not with the bigger powers. The quest of smaller 
powers to align themselves with bigger powers has been noted and studied in the past in 
international relations, amongst others, Robert Keohane who is one of the leading scholars in 
the field.  Womack‘s work on asymmetry theory builds from the work of Keohane and 
assimilates portions of other theories of international relations. Asymmetry emphasises the 
differences in how the larger and smaller perceive the relationship and behave. The smaller 
state is relatively more exposed in its interaction with the larger. This predisposes the smaller 
to being more attentive to the relationship to guide its nature and development Womack 
(2010: 82). 
One of the important premises of asymmetry theory is that to survive in the big bad world of 
international politics, the smaller and weaker states ally themselves with the larger and 
stronger or with each other to secure themselves and their position. However, larger and 
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stronger states cannot dominate the international order for the sake of their narrow interests; 
if they do they would put their position of power and stature at risk by destabilising the 
international system Womack (2004: 360).   
Firsing (2012:107) argues that almost all theories interpret asymmetry as an imbalance of 
capacities and power, a disequilibrium that creates either subordination or a competition for 
domination. Asymmetry theory acknowledges the role of the claim of sovereignty and 
equality, as advanced by other theories.  It builds from other mainstream theories like realist 
theory, by assuming that capacities matter and that states attempt to maximize their interests 
(Womack 2006a:18). What sets asymmetry theory apart is the acceptance of asymmetry 
between states as a valid basis of interaction. It does not regard asymmetry due to the 
capacities and power as a limitation in the relationship between larger and stronger, and 
smaller and weaker states, or as the basis for domination and subordination of the one state by 
the other.  
Asymmetry theory asserts that states in an asymmetric relationship are as similar actors, plus 
or minus the disparity in capacities, rather than actors whose interests and perceptions are 
shaped by their relative positions. States observe and recognise each other‘s statehood and 
sovereignty ahead of any other attribute. This does not mean that these other attributes or 
capacities are not important. 
Of similar importance is the fact that states, irrespective of power and stature, negotiate their 
interactions. Such negotiations are contingent on leadership, history, and culture Womack 
(201:98).  
2.7.2 The nature of asymmetric relations 
Womack (2006, 18)‘s asymmetry theory assumes that capacities matter and that states 
attempt to maximise their interests. He maintains that symmetry theory is not a syncretic 
sampling of what appears attractive from each of the other theories, but rather a 
reinterpretation of international relations from a fundamentally different starting point 
Asymmetry theory envisages that in a relationship between two unequal states, the 
relationship will hold larger significance for the smaller and/or weaker than the larger and/or 
stronger one. This should result in the smaller and/or weaker paying more attention to the 
relationship, planning, coordinating and generally strategizing to ensure that it is not 
overwhelmed by the larger and/or stronger and that it derives the benefits of the relationship 
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(Womack, 2004: 360). By looking at diplomatic relations from the vantage point of the 
smaller state, Womack‘s asymmetry theory takes a different approach from other theories as 
it emphasises the importance of analysing these relationships from the vantage point of both 
states, especially if they have unequal or asymmetric capacities.  This militates against the 
emphasis of other theories on asymmetry that creates disequilibrium that leads to either 
subordination or a competition for domination, and reconceptualises the relationship between 
the smaller and larger states as being on par based on their different and complementary 
capacities.  
The emphasis on capacities underscores the fact that size and scale, political, economic and 
military might are not the only attributes that countries can leverage in international relations. 
To illustrate this point, there are a number of stark examples of countries that punch above 
their weight in international relations such as Cuba, Israel, North Korea and Switzerland. 
South Africa also punches above its weight but in more subtle ways than the others (Draper, 
2011; Davies, 2012; Alden & Schoeman, 2013; Naidu, 2013 & Hazelhurst, 2014). 
Asymmetries inherent in the relationship between states are thus often far more informative. 
Asymmetry theory differs from most international relations theories in that it does not assume 
that relative power implies control (Firsing, 2012:107). 
According to Firsing (2012:107), Womack postulates that most asymmetric relationships are 
peaceful, negotiated and not simply dictated by the stronger side.  In this respect it shares 
common threads with democratic peace theory, which postulates that states with similar 
forms of government will not go to war. Mark (2013: 125) views this differently. 
Competition and conflict arises from similarity in endowment, interests and aspirations rather 
than, as would be expected, from differences. From Mark‘s point of view, differences 
between states lead to complementarity and cooperation. In this way asymmetry makes a 
better basis for international relations. This subverts all theories that interpret imbalance of 
capacities and power as disequilibrium that creates either subordination or a competition for 
domination. Mark (2013) concludes that competition between countries with different 
attributes has more to do with status than ideology. 
2.7.3 Complementarity and cooperation  
Asymmetry theory acknowledges that the world comprises countries of different sizes, 
strengths and capacities on many different dimensions such as politics, economics, culture 
and military capabilities which they endeavour to use to maximise their national interests. 
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The sovereign smaller state need not always defer to the bigger one in all instances.  
Asymmetry theory posits that these differences engender complementarity and cooperation. 
2.7.4 The attributes of managing asymmetric relations 
Womack (2001:135; 2003: 99; 2006:8) advances a number of ways to manage asymmetric 
relationships. These are; focus on mutual understanding and appreciation of each other‘s 
societies and histories, active conversion of hostility to friendship and adroit management of 
a relationship drifting from friendship to hostility, routinization, neutralization and diplomatic 
ritual.  These, individually, are not new or unique to his theory of asymmetry but the 
emphasis and their grouping offers a fresh and informative method of analysis and synthesis. 
2.7.5  Histories and societies  
Advancing mutual understanding and appreciation of each other‘s societies and histories 
entails increasing the opportunities for general contact between the peoples of the two 
societies, through business, educational, cultural exchanges, etc. that should expose them to 
each other and dispel extreme stereotypes, misconceptions, misperceptions and 
misinterpretations. 
Sharing the states‘ histories and culture play an important role in aligning and/ or creating a 
basis for mutual understanding premised on an appreciation of the different backgrounds 
from which information and behaviour emanates and is interpreted. Histories and societies 
provide a context for the current state of a relationship and importantly mitigate current 
misunderstandings. For instance, if current behaviour or action is patently out of line with 
past behaviour or action, it is easier to interpret it as an aberration and seek to rectify it 
instead of taking offense and retaliatory behaviour or action. Knowledge, awareness and 
appreciation of each other‘s histories and societies create common ground. 
2.7.6  Routinization 
Routinization entails opportunities for regular contact and discussions, between decision 
makers and influencers to discuss mutually defined important topics. This builds 
understanding and trust and reduces the potential for misperception and misunderstanding. 
Where misperceptions and misunderstandings arise, they can be addressed before they fester. 
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2.7.7  Diplomatic ritual 
Diplomatic ritual involves according each other the appropriate pageantry and protocol as 
well as what may be seen as pedantic common courtesies. These may include reciprocal 
official visits marked by joint statements celebrating the relationship and pronouncements of 
its importance and stability, mutual respect and continued commitment and valuing of the 
relationship. 
2.7.8 Neutralization 
Neutralization goes hand in hand with routinization and focus on ways to neutralize situations 
that lead to serious disagreement or conflict. Neutralization starts with situating problems or 
challenging situations in the framework of the friendly relationship and common interest. 
These challenges are then taken out of the realm of regular diplomatic interaction and 
referred to expert committees or commissions to address and resolve. Although Womack has 
been advocating asymmetry theory since the mid- 2000s it remains in the periphery of the 
main theories of political science and international relations. This may be an indication of its 
failure to gain traction and acceptance with researchers and scholars.  Nonetheless, it is very 
pertinent and useful to studying and understanding the relationship between countries 
characterised by asymmetry. 
2.8 Critique of asymmetry theory 
The ‗Westphalian System‘ of international relations codified the principles of sovereignty, 
territoriality, autonomy, self-determination, equality and legality of states. These principles 
are the basis for most theories of international relations that often differ on the emphasis they 
place on different principles. Theories such as asymmetry theory place greater emphasis on 
principles such as self-determination, equality and legality. They deemphasise inequalities 
such as those of power, economy and global political status that in the final analysis play a 
big role in the relations between states, symmetric or asymmetric. Power, despite the negative 
connotations associated with it, is real and cannot be wished away. The playing field between 
smaller and larger states is not even. The larger states enjoy many advantages in their 
relations with smaller states. However, the states‘ perception of themselves and their exercise 
of their own agency play an important role in their relations with their asymmetric partners. 
The Westphalian principles do provide a measure of protection from the wanton abuse of 
power by the larger states, especially against the smaller. With the advent of regional bodies 
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such as the European Union that act as a confederation of states transcending individuals 
states in some instances, individual states are no longer the only actors in international 
relations. This challenges the notion and basis of both symmetry and asymmetry generally 
and asymmetry theory in particular.  
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the main and contemporary theoretical perspectives 
used in the study of international relations and gives the rationale for the choice of 
asymmetry theory for this study. The chapter explored the main attributes, the strengths and 
deficiencies, of the different schools of thought and theories of international relations to 
contextualise asymmetry theory. This shows that although asymmetry theory is distinct, it not 
a standalone theory of international relations. It considers and applies many of the same 
attributes of the other theories in understanding international relations. Nonetheless, 
Asymmetry theory provides multiple factors and dimensions in exploring the relationship 
between states. Traditional international relations theories focus on the role and relationships 
from the perspective of larger states, asymmetry theory turns this on its head and focuses on 
role and the perspective of smaller states, especially how they can steer their relationship with 
larger states to their advantage. By categorising the ways by which smaller and larger states 
manage their relationship, asymmetry theory enhances the understanding of this in particular 
but also international relations in general. The chapter also looks at the limitations and 
critiques of asymmetry theory.  
The precepts of asymmetry theory will be used to guide the exploration and analysis of the 
relationship between South Africa and the PRC in the light of the asymmetries between them. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  31 
 
Chapter 3 The evolution of the PRC‟s foreign policy and relations with Africa and 
South Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
In his asymmetry theory of international relations, Womack (2001, 2003, 2006, and 2010) 
explains the importance of knowing, understanding and appreciating the historical and 
broader societal context of asymmetric relationships.  
This chapter explains the PRC‘s foreign policy as a reflection of its history of imperial 
subjugation, internal strife and isolation, its opening up and emergence as an economic giant. 
This provides hints to why the PRC relates to other countries, in particular those that are 
asymmetrically endowed relative to it, such as South Africa.  
Although the PRC sought to expunge Confucianism during the Cultural Revolution, its 
Confucian heritage, that is part of Chinese civilization emphasizes benevolent rule, 
refinement, and social harmony, now underpins its foreign policy and international relations 
as encapsulated in the Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence. The PRC sees this as a basis 
for an independent and differentiated foreign policy and model for international relations. 
This is often at odds with Western conceptualisations of the nature of relationships between 
countries, states and peoples (Nathan & Ross, 1997 &, Womack, 2004: 358). The Five 
Principles of Mutual Coexistence, even if not referred to directly, and acquiescence to the 
―One China Policy,‖ is the foundations of all of the PRC‘s diplomatic ties, encompassing 
those with African countries and South Africa in particular. In the case of South Africa and 
other African countries, there has been a tendency to defer to the PRC beyond these because 
they have not articulated their own conditionalities (Le Pere, 2007). 
This chapter builds on the extensive scholarly literature on the PRC‘s foreign policy in 
general, and towards South Africa in particular, with the context of the PRC‘s Africa policy.  
It looks at how the PRC‘s quest for alternative spheres of influence and not just for resources 
and diplomacy, shape its foreign relations and its preference for partnerships to conduct them, 
especially with smaller countries such as South Africa. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  32 
 
3.2 The PRC‟s foreign policy 
3.2.1 A brief background to the PRC‟s foreign policy 
The PRC‘s foreign policy is characterised as strongly influenced by its nationalism. It can be 
traced back to 1949 when the then Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong, 
announced the principle of ―leaning to one side‖ by which the PRC would seek an alliance 
with the Soviet Union and fight against the US and its Western allies (Tianbiao Zhu, 2001: 
7). Another pillar of its foreign policy even then was developing relationships with the Third 
World served the goal of promoting and preserving national independence (Tianbiao Zhu, 
2001:10). With the PRC‘s opening up policy which began in the late 1970s, it began to 
follow an independent and open foreign policy eschewing formal preferential ties to specific 
countries. The stated goals of the PRC‘s foreign policy are to safeguard world peace, oppose 
all forms of hegemony, and work to achieve domestic economic modernisation. The PRC's 
foreign policy remains rooted in the following principles (Nathan & Ross, 1997, Panda, 
2014);  
 Maintaining Independence and safeguarding national sovereignty 
 Opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace 
 Upholding the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
 Strengthening solidarity of the developing countries, and together opposing 
imperialism and colonialism 
 Improving relations with developed countries to promote common progress  
It has recently introduced the concepts of a ―harmonious society‖ domestically, and 
―harmonious world,‖  ―peaceful development,‖ and places particular emphasis on the 
development of ―good-neighbourly‖ relations and ―partnership‖ in its relations with its 
neighbours and diplomatic allies. 
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Table 2: The PRC‟s foreign policy template 
Term Definition Implications 
―Five 
Principles of 
Peaceful 
Coexistence‖ 
 
 Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
 Mutual non-aggression; 
 Non-interference; 
 Equality and mutual benefit; 
 Peaceful coexistence 
 Good-neighborly relations—
preventing external 
instabilities from ―spilling 
over‖ to fuel internal 
frictions; 
 Non-interference in internal 
affairs, most notably 
Taiwan, Tibet, 
 ―New 
Security 
Concept‖ 
 
 Unveiled in 1997 to reflect China‘s aspiration for a 
new post-Cold War international security order: 
 Adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence; 
 Emphasis on mutually beneficial economic cooperation 
among states; 
 Pursuit of confidence-building measures amongst 
states; 
 Establishment of bilateral ―strategic partnerships‖ that 
are not directed at any third country 
 Marks new proactive 
Chinese approach to 
international affairs; 
 Offers alternative vision of 
international order, 
particularly in relation to the 
U.S. alliance based security 
structure in East Asia. 
 ―Peaceful 
Rise‖/ 
―Peaceful 
Development‖ 
 
Campaign to reassure the international community and particularly neighboring countries, of China‘s 
benign future and that China‘s rise will not be a zero-sum game. 
Period of 
Strategic 
Opportunity‖ 
Conceived in 2002, the next twenty years will be a period during which China‘s relations with its periphery 
and with major powers such as the United States are expected to remain essentially stable to allow the PRC 
to focus its attention on ―building a well-off society‖ at home. 
―Harmonious 
World‖ 
First publicly introduced by Hu Jintao at the World Summit and 60th General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 2005. While the exact meaning and policy implications of ―harmonious world‖ are undefined, 
the slogan is meant to demonstrate China‘s commitment to global peace and stability, and to the goal of a 
more just and equitable international system 
Source:  Center for Strategic and international Studies (CSIS), 2014 
Most assessments of the PRC‘s foreign policy conflate China as a civilization and China as a 
state (Sheffery, 2012 & Schell, 2014)). China as a civilization is the longest continuous 
civilizations in the world. However, although the civilization persists and informs the current 
state, the state is also a reflection of the forces and times that shaped its establishment and 
development since. Ma (2014) quotes scholar Lucian Pye who referred to China as "a 
civilization pretending to be a nation-state."   It is important to remember that China as a state 
only dates back to the founding of the PRC in 1949. This makes the history of the PRC 
relatively new and accessible especially for the purpose of understanding its foreign policy.  
At the level of a civilization, China‘s foreign policy is influenced by its Confucian and Taoist 
philosophical and cultural background (Bell, 2010, Callahan, 2012 & Schell, 2014).  They are 
the origins of its pursuit of harmonious coexistence, a harmonious world and mutually 
beneficial relations. This is at the heart of the Five Principles of  
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3.2.3 The PRC‟s foreign policy in the international relations architecture 
The PRC has reduced the emphasis of foreign relations that are dominated by the 
superpowers to a focus on a diversity of modes of engagements amongst states with differing 
attributes in international relations (Womack, 2004: 358). Womack argues within the context 
of the theory of symmetry that this revives and strengthens some of the best cooperative 
traditions of Chinese foreign policy encapsulated in policies such as the Five Principles. This 
is a significant departure from the Western traditions predicated on realism and liberalism 
which emphasise individualism, self-interest and competition (Nathan & Ross, 1997 & 
Womack, 2004). 
These ideological differences persist and still run deep, hence the continued discomfort with 
the PRC. The PRC does not always share in the Western values, deals and interests. As a one 
party state, governed by a communist party, it differs with the Western countries in their ideals 
of stable democratic political rule and economic freedom. The challenge is that from the 
PRC‘s perspective, the West does not always share in Chinese values and ideals either. From 
the PRC‘s perspective, Western values and ideals are not the default, especially for the PRC.  
Jianying Zha (2011: 212) says that ‗if, broadly speaking, Western culture emphasizes liberty, 
innovation, and the individual, the Confucian culture emphasizes benevolent rule, refinement, 
and social harmony.‖ Are the conventional Western values of; freedom and democracy, 
universal rule of law and justice universal, he asks? 
Can Chinese and Western ideals and values ever be reconciled?  Is such reconciliation a 
condition for equality and sincere friendship? Ayson & Taylor (2008) echo John Ikenberry 
who argues the need to integrate the PRC into the current Western‐led international order 
otherwise the Chinese may conclude that their country is not respected or wanted as a 
member of that order and that the West conspires to contain the PRC. The challenge is that 
the PRC may not want such accommodation and rather aspire to a new world order which 
incorporates its ideals and values.  
 The PRC chooses to pursue an independent foreign policy Li (2013: 36). This puts it at odds 
with the United States and its allies who inform much of Western foreign policy. The PRC‘s 
opening up to the world and phenomenal economic growth since the late 1970s obscure the 
reality that until then it was a pariah state in Western eyes. To many Westerners it has not 
been fully ―rehabilitated‖ from its pariah status despite the fact that they continue to benefit 
enormously from the PRC‘s economic growth while castigating it human rights violations, 
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poor labour and working conditions, and polluting the environment. The West‘s benefit in the 
PRC‘s growth remains the least and untold story. 
The treatment of the PRC as inferior by Western powers, that it is conscious of, is not a new 
phenomenon. It is part of a long history that the Chinese and their leaders are well aware of 
and informs its foreign policy. Sir Reginald Johnston (2011: 6), who is the only non –Chinese 
tutor to a Chinese Emperor, and witnessed the demise of the Chinese Empire in the early 
1900s, writes that  
―if the Western nations thought that the partition of China was likely to go merrily forward without 
more than a few grimaces from the Chinese government and its people, they soon discovered their 
mistake. Foreign aggression was beginning to turn a ―civilisation‖ into a nation. The Chinese who had 
hardly known what patriotism meant began to realise that they lived in a world of competing and 
often antagonistic national groups, and their group which was numerically the greatest of all and 
occupied (if dependencies be included) a larger geographical area than any other, experienced less 
influence and was treated with less respect than many Western countries possessing scarcely one 
twentieth of the territory and population of China. 
 The Chinese were then, as they are now, too proud and sensitive a race to reconcile themselves to a 
position of permanent inferiority among nations. They could not be expected to acquiesce in the 
theory that Western races or the Japanese were their racial superiors; and any such theory is (in the 
opinion of those who know them best) patently false, it was something better than vanity that made 
them reject it.‖  
This was not tolerated by China then or the PRC now and underlies its suspicion of Western 
powers and explains its rapprochement with developing countries, especially those subjected 
to colonialism and imperialism. 
3.2.4 The PRC‟s position in the international system and quest for spheres of influence 
Although it is now the second biggest economy in the world, its marginalisation continues 
through exclusion from influential forums such as the G7(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the U.S. and U.K) and after the inclusion of Russia in 1998, which paradoxically is 
supposed to represent the most industrialized economies of which it is one. This remains 
despite the fact that the PRC is part of the G20 comprising Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, the PRC, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, 
European Union. The G20, regardless its growing prominence, has not replaced the G8. 
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Interestingly, the G8 has itself not replaced the G7 which indicates that Russia was appended 
and not included in the G7. This contrasts with the inclusion of Canada into what was then 
the G6 which nobody remembers because it was genuinely replaced by the G7 so that there is 
no longer any reference to the ―G6 and Canada‖ in the same way that reference is made to the 
―G7 and Russia.‖ 
The reality is that the PRC is viewed as an outsider, just like most developing countries, 
warranting no institutionalized association with the G7. This position is reflected by scholars 
such as John Kirton who hold that the PRC lacks the full set of qualities required for 
membership in these exclusive clubs (Kirton, 1999).  
The PRC‘s exclusion encourages it‘ through its foreign policy and relations, to seek the 
formation of clubs that exclude the G7 where it is an equal partner, leads and or is relevant, 
hence the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), comprising the PRC, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India the PRC, South 
Africa), Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), etc. In this context BRICS is 
conceptualised beyond the parameters used by O'Neill when he coined the BRIC ellipsis.  
This is an endeavour to challenge the hegemony of historic imperial and colonial powers and 
their allies who still stick together and change ―the rules of the game.‖ The Chinese are loathe 
continuing to uphold a Western led international order that they had no role in shaping. The 
PRC endeavours to bypass the West where it can do so without jeopardising its own interests. 
On the other hand, the West is not yet ready to adapt the existing world order to meet the 
PRC's aspirations. It persists in setting the rules of the road without the PRC and then expects 
it to accept them (Mark, 2013). However, the goal of these manoeuvres is not to push the 
PRC out of international trade given its strategic role in this regard but rather to ensure that it 
trade and relates on their terms. Mark (2013) notes that influential historians such as Shi 
Yinhong, have argued that the West should think not only of "integrating China into the 
Western liberal order" but instead try to adapt that order "to accommodate China." Shi 
Yinhong argues that this adaptation would involve a major redistribution of formal influence 
in the global financial and security institutional order, with authority and status bestowed on 
member states according to, as Shi Yinhong puts it, to the "factual strength they respectively 
have and the contribution they have made‖ and not to some ―preconceived ideas about who 
should rule" or be influential or be the next superpower. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, (2013) says that 
while the U.S. has expected the PRC to become a "responsible stakeholder" in the global 
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system, the PRC has calls for a "new type of great power relations," in which the U.S. 
recognizes the PRC's core interests and respects it as an equal (Schell, 2014). The PRC 
expects an appreciation that its interests and aspirations for itself and the world do not always 
coincide with those of the West and that this does not minimise their significance or 
invalidate them (Ming Xia, 2013). If this is not forthcoming, it looks to its relationship those 
that accord equality and respect amongst who are the countries of Africa.  
3.2.5 The PRC‟s status and quest for a sphere of influence in the international system 
The PRC is aware of its real position in the global political system relative to the 
conventional and popular perception. Cui Tiankai, Chinese ambassador to the US, points out 
that the PRC is not in the same category of power as the US. From the PRC‘s perspective the 
U.S. is still much more developed, much stronger. The PRC may be huge but it is still a 
developing country, whether in terms of the economy, science and technology, or military 
power. ―In many respects, we still have a long way to go before we can really be seen as on 
par with the United States (Tepperman, 2013). 
According to Pistor (2013), despite its economic status, the PRC is currently, excluded from 
what is termed ―the swap-lines club‖ (Currency swap lines allow central banks to purchase 
and repurchase currencies from one another which provides countries easy access to the 
underlying currencies) whose membership is restricted to the United States Federal Reserve, 
the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Swiss National 
Bank, and the Bank of Canada. Pistor, while acknowledging that there might be legal reasons 
for this, characterises it as a hint of ―neo-imperial‖ elitism. It is unlikely that these slights are 
unnoticed by the PRC. As Pistor (2013) points out, ―picking partners is an inherently political 
act.‖ This political act has material economic benefits as it provides access to high-demand 
currencies to a select few, relatively strong, countries precisely when the weakest countries 
are at their most vulnerable. It would be inconceivable that the PRC would not factor these 
realities into its foreign policy and international relations. When the PRC emphasises 
‗equality and mutual benefit‘ in its relations with other nations, this is directed as much on 
how it wants to be treated as it is on how it wants to treat others. The PRC, using Keohane‘s 
(1969: 295) categorisation of states, wants to be system-determining rather than just system-
influencing, system-affecting or system-complaint in world affairs. This informs it quest for 
an overhaul of multilateral agencies such as the IMF and World Bank, and the creation of 
alternatives such as the BRICS‘ New Development Bank (NDB). 
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The PRC‘s national and international aspirations were reiterated by President Xi when 
delivered a speech at a group study session of members of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist Party of China Central Committee. Xi (Xinhua, 2014) said that ―China should be 
portrayed as a civilized country featuring rich history, ethnic unity and cultural diversity, and 
as an oriental power with good government, developed economy, cultural prosperity, national 
unity and beautiful mountains and rivers. The PRC should also be marked as a responsible 
country that advocates peaceful and common development, safeguards international justice, 
and makes contributions to humanity, and as a socialist country which is open, amicable, 
promising and vibrant.‖ President Xi‘s sounds contemporary but is a rehash of the PRC‘s 
foreign policy dating back to 1949 as indicated earlier in this chapter.  
Despite the on-going uncertainty and concern about the PRC‘s self-proclaimed ―peaceful 
rise‖ the scope for the PRC to be a military superpower is both limited and moot. The sheer 
rise of the PRC and its growing influence in Asia and Africa is a de facto dilution of the 
power, influence and status of the existing hegemon(s) and power structures.  Wendt (1992: 
407) posits that, ―competitive systems of interaction are prone to security "dilemmas," in 
which the efforts of actors to enhance their security unilaterally threaten the security of the 
others, perpetuating distrust and alienation.‖ In this way, the PRC does not need superior 
military capability to be seen as a threat. It is a threat by virtue of coming into its own and the 
shift this engenders in the global balance of power (Ming Xia, 2013). This impacts on its 
foreign relations, its foreign policy notwithstanding. In Africa and South Africa in particular, 
the PRC is challenging the century old monopoly the West has had on its socio-politics, 
economics and culture. 
3.2.6 The impact of the PRC‟s „dependent‟ independence on its foreign relations 
The PRC endeavours to follow an independent foreign policy, especially from the West.  
Ironically, communism and socialism are Western social, political and economic ideologies 
that the PRC has adopted and customised (Ma, 2014). The perceived differences may be over 
exaggerated as are the fears of the ―westernisation" of the Chinese political system. Walter 
and Howie (2012) make two salient points. The first is that the PRC‘s economy is no 
different from any other, in spite of the Chinese characteristics. They argue that if there are 
such things as economic laws, they work just as well in the PRC and for Chinese businesses 
as they do in other markets (Walter and Howie, 2012: xvii). The second point is that while 
the idea that capitalist tools can work in socialist hands is home grown (Deng Xiaoping) and 
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its realisation required help from capitalist experts that the PRC invited without any coercion. 
Walter and Howie (2012: 10) claim that it is not an exaggeration to say that Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley made the PRC‘s state-owned corporate sector and by extension its 
economy what it is today. They maintain that without Western financial know-how 
exemplified by these banks SOEs would long since have lapsed into obscurity. It is de rigueur 
to focus on the PRC‘s investments in other countries and forget that huge inflows that 
preceded its current economic status. Stiglitz (2002: 183) states that ―the Chinese government 
invited foreign firms into the country, to participate in joint ventures. And foreign firms came 
in droves - the PRC became the largest recipient of foreign direct investment among 
emerging markets, and number eight in the world below only the United States, Belgium, 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands and France.‖  
This trend continues. Walter and Howie (2011: 6) claim that by 2010 foreign companies were 
committing US$100 billion in foreign direct investment in their manufacturing operations in 
the Chinese market. In the last quarter of 2013 alone Xinhua reported that the PRC had net 
inflows of direct investment to the value of 362.1 billion Yuan (US$50 billion). This figure 
excludes copying and expropriation of intellectual capital.  For example Chinese companies' 
lack of strong development capabilities has resulted in a number of highly publicised 
intellectual property disputes (Gong Zhengzheng, 2004). A US Commission on the Theft of 
American Intellectual Property alleges that  ―National industrial policy goals in China 
encourage IP theft, and an extraordinary number of Chinese in business and government 
entities are engaged in this practice ‖ (Woollacott, 2013). The Commission estimates this to 
be worth US$240 billion a year in respect of the US. If this allegation is true, then similar 
behaviour in Europe and the rest of the world garners the PRC staggering benefit every year. 
As Ted Fishman (2005: 252) says, ―China‘s failure to police intellectual property, in effect, 
creates a massive global subsidy worth hundreds of billions of dollars to its businesses and 
people.‖ Is this a case of the PRC challenging Western conceptualisations of or valuing 
intellectual property and property rights differently or just expediency? 
To this day, the PRC‘s economic performance is influenced by the presence of many 
multinational companies from the developed countries that have brought their technologies 
and know-how and employ millions of Chinese workers (Nolan, 2014). It is also true that 
they reap substantial profits and earn much higher rates of return on the capital invested! 
Though the PRC has adopted many Western practices, it retains a distinct culture with its 
own set of values and goals.  The challenge for the PRC is how attractive are its ideals in 
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comparison to those of the US and its allies in the West. Do other countries voluntarily and 
freely aspire to its model and example? As (Walter and Howie, 2011:10) argue ―the adoption 
of laws, accounting standards, markets, and other mechanisms of international capitalism are 
just examples of the formalism that characterizes the PRC today. The names are the same as 
in the West, but what things are and how they work is hidden beneath the surface. Given the 
state‘s scale in critical sectors, together with the enormous power of the government, the 
influence of this patronage system pervades all aspects of the PRC‘s economy. It inevitably 
undermines the very contents of its superficially internationalized institutions.‖  From the 
PRC‘s perspective, its values and goals are equally valid as re the Western ones and the West 
must engage with them as such. 
On 21 January 2014, Premier Li Keqiang met and thanked foreign experts working in the 
PRC for their contribution to the country's modernisation drive. According to Zhao Yinan 
(2014), Premier Li said, "What China has achieved in its reform and opening-up should be 
attributed not only to the hard work of the Chinese people, but also to the wisdom and 
painstaking efforts of the foreign experts." This can be dismissed as a mere diplomatic 
overture but it tells the truth. 
Paradoxically, what this makes it clear that the PRC has and accepts a variety of Western 
norms, values and knowhow. Its opening up in the later 1970s and its going out strategies in 
the 1990s epitomise its buying in into the ways of the West. These ways have been 
instrumental to its phenomenal economic achievements. For the PRC to then negate these in 
favour of Chinese ways is disingenuous. However it continues to seek to align itself with 
marginalised countries based on its own experiences. It can even argue that it experiences 
place it in a better position to help others is a similar position. 
3.2.7 The PRC foreign policy, sovereignty and territorial integrity  
For the PRC the ramifications of civil strife are not removed and abstract but real, as it 
struggles with its relationship with Taiwan and a number of its minority autonomous regions, 
and the challenges of reintegrating Hong Kong and Macau to the mainland. The PRC‘s 
insistence on the ―One China Policy‖ may seem pedantic if the fact that they have not 
formally declared peace ending the conflict between them and therefore while they are 
technically not fighting they are still at war. Furthermore, Taiwan lays claim on the territory 
of the PRC as much as the PRC lays claim on Taiwan (Sung and Lin, 2014). Thus, both the 
PRC and Taiwan espouse the ―One China Policy‖ which means that in the long run only one 
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of them can remain sovereign and that one must be subsumed into the other. The One China 
Policy is a stated principle of the PRC‘s foreign policy accidence to which is a condition for 
diplomatic ties. 
Despite its phenomenal economic growth and ascendency to become the second biggest 
economy, the PRC remains a developing country with the biggest part of its population poor 
and on par with the poor in other developing countries. As Brown (2012) points out, ―China 
may boast more than 96 dollar billionaires now, but 150 million Chinese still live in poverty. 
The country may have become the second richest in the world on aggregate, but per capita 
income hovers near 90th, similar to per capita income in Cuba and Namibia.‖  It straddles the 
developed and developing world with a slant to the latter. It is the factors that contribute to 
the PRC‘s insistence on territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in each other‘s 
internal affairs; equality, in its African policy that leads to a charge of cosying up to despots 
and thus undermining good governance and human rights. The fact is that the experience of 
the violation of its territorial integrity, subjugation and treatment of Chinese as unequal and 
inferior by most Western powers is still fresh and in some instances still persist. The memory 
of the opium wars (opium remains taboo in China to this day, even for medical treatment as 
morphine) and concomitant ―unequal treaties‖ that were largely responsible for the fall of the 
Chinese empire (Zhao Xu, 2013), annexure of Hong Kong by Britain and Japanese 
aggression is still raw and ragging in the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The foreign 
policy principles of safeguarding national sovereignty and seeking ―harmonious society‖ and 
the development of ―good-neighbourly‖ relations with its neighbours are contested by those 
who asses its actions rather than focus on its rhetoric. 
The PRC‘s relationship with any country is informed by its own national interests (Ming Xia, 
2013). It is not for the PRC to define and champion other countries‘ national interests. 
 3.3. The PRC‟s Africa policy  
3.3.1 Background to China- Africa relations 
In Chapter 2, a number of ways to manage asymmetric relationships; focus on mutual 
understanding and appreciation of each other‘s societies and histories, routinization and 
diplomatic ritual, as advanced by Womack (2006:8) were introduced.   
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The formal principles that guide the PRC‘s foreign policy and relations with African 
countries are presented in an official paper setting out its  "China's African Policy‖ issued in 
January 2006.  
The policy begins by reiterating the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the basis of 
the PRC‘s relations and engagement with all countries.  Zhang Chun has identified four 
dimensions in the PRC‘s relations with African countries; political, economic, diplomatic and 
cultural dimensions. These dimensions are underpinned by the key elements of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The political dimension is underpinned by equality, 
sincerity, friendship; the economic dimension by mutual benefit, reciprocity and common 
prosperity; the international dimension mutual support and close coordination and the cultural 
dimension by mutual learning and seeking common development. The PRC's African Policy 
is a confirmation and extension of the 5 principles of Sino- African relations put forward by 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai  on his tour of ten African (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia) countries  from December 1963 to 
January 1964 and of the five principles concerning the development of a long-term, stable, 
and all-round cooperative relationship between the PRC and the African countries articulated 
during President Jiang Zemin‘s visit of six African countries (Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe) in May 1996 (Kong, 2003, Le Pere, 2007a and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,  the People's Republic of China). 
As already indicated, this puts the PRC's African Policy firmly in its overall foreign policy. 
The first part of the policy acknowledges Africa‘s endowments in land and natural resources, 
but inversely, highlights the PRC‘s interest in them. Part two and three speak to a common 
history of colonisation and independence, material and political support as attested to by the 
accedence to the ―One China Policy.‖ The ―One China Policy is a tenet of the PRC‘s foreign 
relations which is applied across the board and not only with regard to African countries, 
although the Taiwan and Tibet ―questions‖ are raised mostly in the PRC‘s relations with 
African countries. Large (2008), Alden and Alves (2008), Gazibo and Mbabia (2012) & 
Strauss (2009) refer to the PRC‗s appeal to history to legitimize its current relations with 
Africa countries.  To illustrate this Gazibo and Mbabia (2012) quote Premier Minister, Wen 
Jiabao‘s speech at the opening ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) Fourth Ministerial Conference at Sharm el-Sheikh in 2009, Chinese declared:  
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―I would like to point out here that neither the Chinese presence in Africa, nor the support of the 
African countries to China are recent phenomena. Already in the 50s and 60s of the past century 
China and Africa have fought side by side in the battle against imperialism, colonialism and 
hegemony, and have advanced hand in hand on the rocky path of economic recovery.‖  
The PRC‘s focus on African countries was (is) not aimed at outmanoeuvring the West. When 
the PRC refocused on its relations with African countries in the late 1980s, after a lull 
occasioned by its internal focus during the Cultural Revolution, the West had despaired and 
given up on the continent, a reality broadcast by The Economist‘s 11 May 2000 cover page 
which declared Africa ―The hopeless continent.‖ This Afro-pessimism did not deter the 
PRC‘s engagement with African countries (Cornelissen, 2009). Instead it saw the opportunity 
this created for it and took it. By the time the West made a U-turn, the PRC had become 
entrenched and the West‘s historical advantage had been eroded. Instead of redoubling its 
efforts, the West has only redoubled its rhetoric while the PRC engages in highly visible 
outcome-oriented and practical initiatives; building infrastructure; providing preferential 
loans, sending experts and technicians; providing needed training, etc. even if some of them 
are hyped up or provided in return to access to resources (van de Looy, 2006). If the adage 
actions speak louder than words holds, action based diplomacy should prevail over 
megaphone diplomacy. This is the convergence and confluence of routinization and 
diplomatic ritual when applying the theory of asymmetry. 
3.3.2 The channels of engagement between the PRC and African countries 
According to the theory of asymmetry, fostering mutual understanding and appreciation of 
each other‘s societies and histories and diplomatic ritual are important mechanisms in 
managing relations between asymmetric states.   
It is common to highlight Chinese investment in resources and overlook the fact that it 
invests in all sectors of many African countries‘ economies (Ford, 2013: 88), and its own 
diplomatic intent and overlook its support of the diplomatic aims of its partners, especially 
the smaller. 
Thus, the Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence notwithstanding, the PRC‘s Africa Policy is 
a pragmatic and strategic policy informed by the PRC‘s interests. Part four deals with deals 
with the technical details of the implementation of the policy; high-level visits, exchanges 
between political parties, consultation mechanisms, cooperation in international affairs, 
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exchanges between local governments, trade, Investment, financial cooperation, 
infrastructure, resources cooperation, tourism cooperation, debt reduction and relief, 
economic assistance, multilateral cooperation, education, science, culture, health and social 
aspects, peace and security. 
This may tell us something about how institutions of sovereign states are reproduced through 
social interaction, but it does not tell us why such a structure of identity and interest would 
arise in the first place. Two conditions would seem necessary for this to happen: (1) the 
density and regularity of interactions must be sufficiently high and (2) actors must be 
dissatisfied with pre-existing forms of identity and interaction (Wendt, 1992: 414). 
Part five is the PRC‘s commitment to its execution and part six a provision for the PRC‘s 
relations with non-state actors in Africa. A look at initiatives such as FOCAC shows the 
extent to which the PRC takes the lead in its relationships with African countries.  The PRC 
makes concrete commitments, monitors progress and follows through at the next FOCAC 
meeting. The PRC seeks concrete and practical ways to pursue mutual benefit from its 
perspective. From this the conclusion can be drawn that this policy is about the PRC‘s 
relations with Africa and not Africa‘s relations with the PRC. There is gritty nationalistic 
fervour posing as openness and ―equalness‖ in this. This leaves a strong impression of a 
patron -client relationship. This clientelism sees the PRC offering unconditional assistance in 
return for resources and political support in multilateral forums. African countries should not 
believe that the PRC is altruistic benevolent country. What the PRC seeks most of all is its 
own advancement and stature. 
The PRC calibrates, monitors and measures its FOCAC commitments from its perspective, 
which is not always aligned to the perspective of its African partners. Shelton (2009: 4) says 
African decision makers and independent researchers have had difficulty in accurately 
assessing the actual implementation of specific undertakings outlined in the various FOCAC 
action plans and have been forced to rely on official Chinese assessments. The heavy focus 
on the PRC‘s perspective raises the question whether there should be an Africa policy on its 
relationship with the PRC or at least an African dimension in the way the relationship is 
conceived. To do this, African countries will have to focus on practical initiatives and be as 
results oriented as the PRC is. African countries must commit to their own deliverables, 
monitors their progress towards achieving them and follow through. African countries must 
seek mutual benefit from their perspective. Although attempts are made in this regard 
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(Dzinesa and Masters, 2009), they remain focused on extracting Chinese contributions rather 
than genuine African agency. 
Lin Jones (2009) says that due to its own historical suffering from foreign invasions, the 
PRC‘s foreign policy highly embraces the principle of sovereignty and equality. African 
countries, with similar histories, can relate to this. This has resulted in a non-interventionist 
and no strings attached assistance by the PRC to African countries. This is in variance to 
Western relations and assistance that comes with conditions especially with regard to 
governance and human rights. The PRC is, as a result, often labelled as purely opportunistic 
and mercantilist is securing resources. African despots and dictators are said to use the PRC 
to bypass conditionality of Western countries‘ and persist with their flouting of governance. 
According to Aidoo (2012), the PRC has stopped ideologically driven engagements with 
African countries to become an economically driven pragmatist focused on resources and 
market for its finished goods offering cheap loans and infrastructure projects in return. The 
PRC‘s mercantilist tendencies are not reserved for relations with Africa but can be found in 
almost all its diplomatic ties. Furthermore, the PRC‘s communism and lack of democratic 
governance do not only come to the fore in its relations with African countries. All countries, 
not only Africa countries, with diplomatic ties with the PRC relate with an authoritarian state 
governed by a communist party that lacks democratic governance in the Western sense. 
3.3.3 The imperative for African initiative and agency in the relationship between the 
PRC and African countries 
  In 1964, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai laid out eight principles that still govern the PRC‘s 
foreign aid as follows: (i) equality and mutual benefit; (ii) respect for sovereignty with no 
conditions attached; (iii) provided through interest‐free or low interest loans; (iv) promotes 
self‐reliance, not dependency; (v) quick results; (vi) uses best‐quality equipment of Chinese 
manufacture; (vii) emphasises technology transfer through technical assistance; (viii) Chinese 
experts will live at the standard of local experts (Zhou, 1964 in Bräutigam, 2011). From 
asymmetry theory perspective, this accords more with with routinization, neutralization and 
diplomatic ritual in the development of the PRC‘s relations with African countries. 
Asymmetry theory avers that African countries, as the junior partners, should be using 
routinization, neutralization and diplomatic ritual more their relationships with the PRC 
which appears not to be the cases in many instances. 
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What seems to be lacking are Africa‘s principles governing its use and offer of foreign 
assistance.  In other words, what is lacking is African agency (Taylor, 2012).  Mohan and 
Lampert (2013) have called for reinserting African agency into the PRC- Africa relations.  
Zoumara (2013) argues that the challenge in the PRC-Africa relationship on Africa's 
sustainable development cannot be solely and squarely placed on the PRC. He says the onus 
lies with African leaders to conceive and execute pragmatic projects, and to direct Chinese 
investments and aid into sectors that will yield maximum benefits and impact positively on 
the lives of its people.  
Zhong Jianhua (2013), China‘s Special Representative on African Affairs, responding to 
Sanusi‘s claim, rejects comparison between the PRC-Africa trade patterns to those of the 
colonial era but agrees that Africa must regard the PRC as a competitor pursuing its own 
interests. The very real fear of Africa‘s deindustrialization in the face of Chinese 
manufacturing capacity, erasing decades of development gains (Alden, 2008a: 228) are not 
new but the alternative of Chinese non- engagement is also not tenable given the PRC‘s 
growing economic role in the international order and global dominance in manufacturing.. 
The PRC‘s global emergence offers African countries an opportunity to diversify their 
trading, investment and diplomatic partnerships. This should reduce their dependence on 
either the Western powers or the PRC. Competition amongst partners for opportunities and 
influence as a result of the PRC‘s emergence should be overwhelmingly good for African and 
African countries as they seek to get a bigger share of its global investments and trade (Stijns 
and Traore, 2013: 18).  Their relationship with the PRC is not going to be any less 
challenging that that with the US and Western countries but they stand to benefit from it if 
managed properly, especially by ensuring that the terns of engagement reflects their needs 
and interests rather than just those of the PRC.  
A key feature of the PRC‘s policy and relations with Africa is its pervasiveness. It maintains 
active diplomatic relations with all African countries with whom it has diplomatic ties. It 
endeavours to treat them equally. For example, a state visit by a small country to Beijing is 
afforded the same protocol as that of a larger one. 
Finally, it is important to realise that the PRC‘s relationship with Africa, or any country for 
that matter, is based on realpolitik, it will change with changes in the PRC‘S needs and 
interests. 
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 It is crucial to realise that the PRC‘s broader international relations does not revolve around 
Africa and African countries at all. ―The focus on the relationship between the PRC and 
many African countries belies the fact that in reality the PRC invests, trades and engages 
diplomatically with African countries comparatively less than is commonly proclaimed. In 
actual fact, those that bemoan the relationship between the PRC and many African countries 
most are themselves the beneficiaries of the PRC‘s massive investments, trade and diplomatic 
ties (Sithole, 2013). The PRC is more important to African countries than they are to the 
PRC. This is so despite the fact that African countries have the resources that are crucial to 
the PRC‘s resource security, a fundamental pillar of its foreign policy. This difference can be 
found in the PRC‘s relationship with South Africa. It also influences South Africa‘s foreign 
policy, especially as regards the PRC. 
3.4. South Africa‟s foreign policy 
3.4.1 The roots of South Africa‟s foreign policy 
South Africa‘s foreign policy is an amalgam of the pre-1994 and post 1994 state (Gelb, 
2001). The post 1994 South Africa inherited many of the diplomatic ties of its predecessor. 
However, its relationship with the PRC is solely a product of the post 1994 state. 
Furthermore, modern South Africa‘s foreign policy is informed by the ruling party, the 
African National Congress (ANC)‘s foreign policy ambitions are encapsulated in Nelson 
Mandela‘s 1991statement at the UN General Assembly. Mandela committed a democratic 
South Africa to re-join the international community and espouse a new world order 
characterised as he said by, among other things:  
―a democratic system of international relations; respect for the right of nations to self-determination 
and independence; respect for human rights; the elimination of poverty, deprivation and economic 
backwardness; an end to the practice of the resort to force to settle international disputes; protection of 
the environment; the strengthening and democratization of the institutions of this Organization to 
ensure that it plays its role as one of the principal architects of that new world order.‖ 
Mbeki (1991) as the de facto ANC‗s foreign minister affirmed Mandela‘s stance reiterated 
this stance and reinforced it later as the President of South Africa.  Mandela went on to 
advocate for what he termed a negotiated, just and stable peace in the many parts of the world 
beset by conflict and the eradication of poverty and inequality as it impacted on countries‘ 
domestic affairs and influenced international relations. In 1993 Mandela was to again 
articulate what SA‘s foreign policy would be in the future. He reiterated more succinctly that, 
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South Africa`s future foreign relations will be based on its belief that human rights should be 
the core concern of international relations, and it would be ready to play a role in fostering 
peace and prosperity in the world that is shared by the community of nations.  
The principles which serve as guidelines in the conduct of SA‘s foreign relations currently 
include:  
• A commitment to the promotion of human rights 
• A commitment to the promotion of democracy 
• A commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations 
• A commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed upon mechanisms for the 
resolution of conflicts 
• A commitment to Africa in world affairs, and 
• A commitment to economic development through regional and international co-operation in 
an interdependent (and globalised) world. 
3.4.2 South Africa‟s foreign policy currently 
South Africa‘s foreign policy has developed from the stance of the ANC while still in exile to 
Nelson Mandela‘s 1991 statement at the UN General Assembly to what it is today. South 
Africa has, according to Neethling (2011: 37), openly undertaken to; 
• Actively engage in efforts to secure international peace and security, promote disarmament, 
prevent genocide, restrict the proliferation of arms and secure a new world security compact 
through the UN (as the primary global security body), the Non-Aligned Movement, the 
African Union, the Southern African Development Community, the Commonwealth and 
other multilateral fora. 
• Promote multilateralism to secure a rules-based international system 
• Promote the democratisation and reform of the United Nations system and the Bretton 
Woods Institutions (i.e. International Monetary Fund and World Bank). 
• Promote the Agenda of the South through South-South Co-operation and North-South 
Partnerships. 
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• Eradication of poverty through the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals by 
2015, and through the implementation of agreements such as the WTO Doha Development 
Agenda, the Monterrey Finance for Development, World Conference Against Racism and the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development. 
These form a continuous thread in SA‘s practice of foreign relations. They were also a core 
element in President Thabo Mbeki‘s African Renaissance project in the form of Millennium 
Partnership for the Africa Recovery Programme' (MAP) (Pityana, 2001) which crystallised 
into New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Despite the clearly articulated 
pan-African aspirations, Alden and Soko (2005) and Bond (2004) ascribe hegemonic 
tendencies to South Africa's economic relations with Africa. On the other hand, Qobo 
(2010:16) sees South Africa‘s foreign policy as a grand vision of a harmonious world heavily 
influenced by what he characterises as a ‗liberal- democratic egalitarian framework‘ that 
privileges human rights, peace building, equality and justice in the international order. This 
vision has proved very difficult to live up. This is exemplified by its decision to abandon 
Taiwan and accept the ―one China Policy‖ and form diplomatic ties with the PRC its human 
rights record notwithstanding. Geldenhuys (2011: 20) notes that although South Africa‘s 
record as a global citizen remains uneven, it is improving. 
3.4.3 South Africa‟s foreign policy; intentions versus interests 
South Africa has not always lived up to the core principles of its foreign policy. Its 
malleability started to show when, despite its avowal of human rights as a key principle of its 
foreign policy and relations; it chose diplomatic relations with the PRC over Taiwan despite 
the former‘s human rights record. This was followed by contradictory decisions in the two 
terms that it has served as a non-permanent member of the UNSC illustrated by its vote 
against action to hold Myanmar to account for human rights abuses and its back paddling 
after voting in support of a no-fly zone over Libya during the war against Muammar Gaddafi. 
The foreign policy stance reiterates but fails to reinforce the values of democracy and human 
rights in its dealings despotic and autocratic governments. Taylor (2001) earlier characterised 
this as South Africa‘s post-apartheid foreign relations being ―Stuck in the middle GEAR!‖  
South Africa‗s foreign policy confuses and conflates national priorities, national and 
nationalist interest (Habib, 2009:154; Landsberg, 2010: 289 & Neethling, 2011:37). Habib 
(2009:154) argues that South Africa‘s foreign policy agenda and practice has been a product 
of traditional nationalist aspirations. Amongst the overriding motives of nationalism is to 
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overthrow colonialism and imperialism and their legacies of racial inequality and inequitably 
structured and unjust global order. Nathan (2011: 63) says that,  
―The anti-imperialist core revolved around the following themes: the iniquitous political and 
economic power imbalance between the North and the South, to the great detriment of the poor; the 
dire need to reform the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, and other international organizations in 
order to address the power imbalance and resultant inequities; the domineering and hypocritical 
approach of Western states that use these organizations to chide and bully developing countries while 
ignoring such reprehensible behaviour as Israel‘s occupation of Palestine; South– South cooperation 
and solidarity as a form of collective strength; and multilateralism and  respect for international law as 
the only legitimate basis for inter-state relations and the resolution of international crises.‖ 
Landsberg (2010: 289) maintains that domestic priorities are presented as national interest. It 
is imperative to link domestic and foreign policy objectives. South Africa needs a coherent 
and consistent foreign policy. A clearly articulated foreign policy and programme will help it 
navigate and benefit from its ―strategic partnership‖ with China. To have an effective foreign 
policy, South Africa should articulate its national strategic priorities to arrive at a clear 
national interest paradigm (Landsberg, 2010: 274). Alden and Aran (2012: 4) posit that ―what 
constitutes national interest, how it is determined and ultimately implemented are crucial to 
understanding the choices and responses pursued by states in international affairs.‖ This they 
say is characterised by a series of self-interested strategies in pursuit of security and material 
wealth in competition with other states. 
South Africa has not been comfortable with rationalist and realist conception of international 
relations, emphasises its global responsibilities at times and it domestic needs at other times. 
This vacillation arises in part due to a lack of a coherent sense of its own interests and the 
comfort to advance them in its international relations. It needs to appreciate the diminished 
distinction between domestic and foreign affairs and the interrelationship between them. 
Landsberg (2010: 275) cites Thomas Robinson who contends a typology of six different 
types of national interests; 
―1. primary interests, which include protection of the nation‘s physical, political, and cultural identity, 
and survival against encroachment from the outside. All nations hold these interests and must defend 
them at any price; 
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2. secondary interests, which fall outside primary interests but contribute to them. These may for 
example include protection for citizens abroad and maintaining proper immunities for a nation‘s 
diplomats abroad; 
3. permanent interests, or those which are relatively constant over long periods of time; they vary with 
time but only slowly; 
4. variable interests, which cut across personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan 
politics, and political and moral folkways; in other words, whatever a nation has decided is in its 
national interest at any particular time; 
5. general interests, or those which a nation can apply in a positive manner to a large geographic area, 
to a large number of nations, or in several specific fields, such as economics, trade, diplomatic 
intercourse, or international law; and 
6. specific interests, which are those positive interests that are usually closely defined in time and/or 
space, and are logical outgrowths of general interests.‖ 
The challenge facing South Africa is to construct its foreign relations from its perspective. 
This will require balancing the noble values articulated by the ANC in exile, Mandela at the 
UN and translated into its official policy after 1994 with its interests. This may prove very 
difficult and contentious after being defined by highly publicised values based foreign policy 
coupled with its own experiences of contending with and overcoming the inhumanity of 
apartheid. 
3.4.4 South Africa‟s foreign policy and the PRC 
There are areas where South Africa‘s foreign policy stance is similar to that of the PRC.   
Both countries seek to advance multilateralism in the global political arena. To this end they 
advocate for the democratisation and reform of the UN system and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (i.e. IMF and World Bank). This does not mean that they necessarily seek the 
same outcomes of the envisaged changes. For instance, the PRC is a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council, a privilege it is unlikely to forego very easily in the quest for a 
democratic UN. The PRC and South Africa‘s foreign policy stances are pervaded by an 
overly anti-imperialist paradigm that disdains the economic and political power imbalance 
between the North and the South. The PRC and South Africa are eager to show that they are 
not dictated to by the West. There are also a number of areas where similarities exist although 
they are articulated differently. South Africa commits to international peace and 
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internationally agreed upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts from a domestic and 
regional perspective. The PRC expresses similar sentiments although it does so prioritising 
state sovereignty and independence. As Bräutigam (2014) points out, ―sovereignty is a key 
norm for Beijing, and it is likely to always trump the new international norm of the 
‗responsibility to protect.‖ Wasserman (2012) argues that South Africa and the PRC are 
positioning themselves as and are seen to be part of the ―vanguard of states in the Global 
South that seek new strategies to redress the systemic marginalisation of the Global South 
and reposition the South as a growth engine for the global economy and a strategic political 
formation.‖ This indicates that there are many areas of common interest and aspirations 
between South Africa and the PRC. 
The areas of commonality are dwarfed by areas of divergence. South Africa has committed 
itself to human rights, democracy, and rule of international law and to internationally shared 
mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts. Qobo (2013: 17) points out that South Africa‘s 
longstanding commitment to political liberalism, a human rights culture, a liberal business 
climate and regulatory transparency places it at odds with countries such as the PRC that are 
not keen on ―democratization of the market, deepening of democracy, and the empowerment 
of the individual and civil society.‖ The PRC‘s stance is that principles such as democracy 
and human rights in particular are internal affairs of sovereign and independent a state.  
The PRC projects its own preferences and interests in its international relations. South Africa, 
as Qobo (2010: 24) argues tries to be ―a norm setter (on peace building and post-conflict 
reconstruction) or a keen multilateralist with no clear sense of its own interests. No country 
with similar economic characteristics conducts its foreign policy in this fashion.‖ South 
Africa has become known for its championing of and engagement in African affairs for 
advocating the interests of developing countries in international affairs. Its foreign policy 
stance as contained in a number of different strategy documents has bent to reflect the 
thinking and policy preferences of succeeding ministers (Wheeler, 2011). To remedy this, the 
White Paper entitled ―Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu‖ and dated 13 May 
2011 was issued for comment and approved by Cabinet and tabled in Parliament in December 
2012. The White Paper has been criticised for regurgitating the old pillars of foreign policy 
and lack of clarity in what constitutes South Africa‘s national interests and how these will be 
achieved (Wheeler, 2011; Qobo, 2011; Masters, 2012 and Leon, 2013). Its pillars are listed 
as, Africa, South-South cooperation,   multilateralism, economic diplomacy, and partnership 
building with the North. Human rights, democracy and a market economy are not given the 
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prominence they enjoyed in previous pronouncements and statements. The apparent emphasis 
on different principles shows the dilemma South Africa finds itself in. South Africa has to resolve 
the dilemma of having to choose between fulfilling self-interested and globally expected 
roles.  South Africa remain mired in its perceived ―responsibility and obligations (such as 
undoing human rights abuses, given its own past, and promoting democracy), and solidarity 
(such as associating with the development needs of Africa and the South as well as brokering 
peace-keeping deals)‖ (van Wyk, 2004: 125). Although the White paper‘s adoption will not 
lead to binding laws and regulations, it is an important guide on its conduct of international 
relations. It thus required the rigour accorded other White Papers to lead to the introduction 
and adoption of new legislation. 
3.5. The PRC‟s South Africa policy 
3.5.1 The origins of the PRC‟s South Africa foreign policy 
Diplomatic relations between the PRC and South Africa were established in 1998 and 
bilateral visits by senior government official and heads of state ensued. There were a number 
of bilateral agreements that were signed to regularise the relationship. However, the key 
foundational document in the formalisation of relationship between the PRC and South 
Africa is the ―Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership between the People's Republic of China 
and the Republic of South Africa‖ signed on 20 April 2000 (Pretoria Declaration). Although 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are a foundation of the relationship between the 
PRC and South Africa with equality, sovereignty and mutual benefit lifted verbatim into the 
Pretoria Declaration, mutual respect has become ―sincere friendship,‖ non-interference in 
each other‘s internal affairs and peaceful coexistence get addressed through South Africa‘s 
acceptance of the ―One China policy‖.  It is specifically stated and generally understood that 
by accepting the ―One China policy, South Africa cannot have diplomatic ties with Taiwan. 
What is often overlooked is that it also means that it cannot recognise Tibet or any other 
region that seeks to secede from the PRC. What stands out is the importance placed on 
―increased consultation and cooperation in International Affairs, cooperation in the 
establishment of a new international political and economic order, and mutual support in the 
international economic milieu.‖ Again, the PRC makes its priorities in its relationship with 
South Africa very clear. South Africa‘s intentions to leverage the relationship for its own 
developmental priorities are also clearly articulated in the declarations and communiqués, 
especially the Beijing Declaration and the 2011 White Paper on foreign policy. The 
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relationship is also driven by areas of shared interest such as the reform of the international 
multilateral political, economic and financial architecture to reflect new global realities. 
These shared interests are not unique in the relationship between South Africa and the PRC, 
and their individual relations with other similar states. Nonetheless, the PRC‘s relationship 
with democratic South Africa can also be understood in the context of its longstanding 
relationship with the liberation movements. 
Alden and Aran (2012: 61) advocate for a greater recognition of the role of the relationship 
between political parties in international relationships.  They argue that political parties often 
determine the ideological orientation of foreign policy and that this often becomes the policy 
of the government. This is why an important aspect of the PRC-South African relationship is 
the relationship between the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) (Garth Shelton, 2005) which has grown to encompass and has been 
taken over by the ANC (Mofokeng, 2011; Butler, 2012; Kane-Berman, 2013 & The 
Economist, 2013a). This was a major factor in South Africa‘s acceptance of the ―One China 
policy‖ which was a precondition of its diplomatic ties with the PRC and its breaking ties 
with Taiwan. It also explains, in part, the apparent disjuncture between South Africa‘s avowal 
of human rights, democracy and liberal economics and close ties with the PRC which is 
currently opposed to these principles domestically. 
The relationship between South Africa and the PRC was beset by contradictions that were 
difficult to reconcile and required concerted effort to address, for example South Africa 
prioritised human rights while the PRC did not. South Africa‘s decision to desert Taiwan for 
the PRC was involuntary. It may have harboured resentment towards the PRC for forcing it to 
choose when it preferred to have diplomatic ties with both. Hence the PRC‘s    focus on 
engendering  mutual understanding and appreciation of their societies and histories, actively 
working to  convert resentment to friendship through  adept management of a relationship 
using what Womack in his theory of asymmetry calls routinization and diplomatic ritual.   
3.5.2 Similarities between the PRC and South Africa‟s foreign policies 
The PRC and South Africa share many objectives with regard to key multilateral issues and 
on the need for the reform of the international multilateral political (e.g. United Nations 
Security Council), economic and financial architecture (e.g. International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank) to reflect the changes in geo-economics and political sphere marked by the rise 
of the PRC as an economic power, the growing role of emerging markets and growing 
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populations of many developing nations. In this regard the PRC will not have to goad South 
Africa to a particular line of action. South Africa will act following its own convictions. The 
PRC‘s benefit from such action will be incidental even if it is significant. However, there is 
no doubt that the PRC has its national interests at heart in this relationship and it will ensure 
that it achieves them. The PRC‘s may be merely following a soft power approach in 
responding to South Africa economic and developmental focus in their relationship. This 
could lull South Africa into complacency that the PRC would take advantage of. In this 
regard, Nye (2012:153) says that economic resources can be used for both soft as well as hard 
power behaviour. They can be used to attract as well as coerce. The challenge is to tell the 
difference and respond accordingly. 
From an asymmetry theory perspective, in a relationship between two unequal countries, the 
relationship will hold larger significance for the smaller and/or weaker than the larger and/or 
stronger country. The smaller and/or weaker would pay attention to it to avoid being 
overpowered and taken advantage of by the larger and/or stronger one (Womack, 2004: 360). 
From this perspective, in the relationship between South Africa and the PRC, the relationship 
probably matters more for South Africa than for the PRC. Therefore, asymmetry theory 
would envisage South Africa focusing more on the relationship than the PRC. It would 
spearhead most of the initiatives pursuant on its partnership with the PRC, in its interest, 
rather than following the PRC‘s lead. 
3.5.3 The PRC‟s South Africa relations in the African context  
The rationale for the PRC‘s interest in strong ties with South Africa is partly similar to the 
rationale for its policy towards Africa. However, there are key differences that make the 
relationship more reciprocal. 
South Africa is the only country in Africa with significant investments in the PRC. South 
African companies such as SAB Miller, Anglo-Gold Ashanti, Anglo American, Standard 
Bank, Spurand Sasol, have or have had a presence in the PRC (Fakier and Adebajo, 2007). 
Some of these companies have technologies that the PRC needs. For example; in the case of 
Sasol advanced coal and gas conversion to fuel; in the case of Standard Bank, market access 
on the continent and financial expertise in general. The World Economic Forum (2014) ranks 
South Africa‘s financial system highest in the world.  South Africa is recognised as a leader 
in most aspects of mining (Helmreich, 2013: 16). Technology and know-how transfers are 
very important to the PRC hence the proliferation of joint ventures or purchases of existing 
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enterprises instead of setting up new ventures as is the case elsewhere in Africa. The flow of 
these transfers is likely to be from South Africa to the PRC as South Africa has no strategy 
for technology and know-how transfers from the PRC. Although the official declarations and 
communiqués address mutual sharing of know-how on a number of sectors, this is heavily 
weighted in the PRC‘s favour. Furthermore, the trend in investments points to the PRC 
favouring investments in basic activities associated with resource despite recent effort to 
diversify to other sectors. On the other hand investments by South Africa enterprises in the 
PRC are in areas underpinned by sophisticated technology, for example Naspers‘s investment 
Tecent and Sasol. In the case of Sasol, its investments in the PRC were initially contemplated 
because the PRC did not yet have its own coal-to-liquid conversion technology (Winning, 
2011). This is an example of advanced technology that South Africa has developed and 
commercialised beyond its origins in the Fischer-Tropsch invented in Germany (Collings, 
2002. 
Although South Africa is well endowed in some of the  natural resources that the PRC needs, 
it boasts a much more diversified economy and associated skill and capability set (Yao Jing: 
2013). South Africa presents the PRC with an environment that is unlike what it encounters 
with other African countries. It has a democratic and pluralistic political system and sound 
economic policies. It has world-class infrastructure and leading technology and industrial 
capability in many areas on par with many developed countries. Claude Kabemba (2012) 
maintains that in South Africa the PRC focuses on partnerships, joint ventures and supply 
relationships with well-established and profitable enterprises that offer reliable supply chains. 
He contrasts with Chinese investments in other countries in Africa where the focus is on 
outright ownership, extraction and transportation of raw materials to the PRC. 
South Africa is the most advanced economy in Africa and 24
th
 largest economy in the world. 
According to The World Economic Forum‘s The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–
2014:16, ―South Africa does well on measures of the quality of its institutions (41st), 
including intellectual property protection (18th), property rights (20th), and in the efficiency 
of the legal framework in challenging and settling disputes (13
th
 and 12th, respectively). The 
high accountability of its private institutions (2nd) further supports the institutional 
framework. Furthermore, South Africa‘s financial market development remains impressive at 
3rd place. The country also has an efficient market for goods and services (28th), and it does 
reasonably well in more complex areas such as business sophistication (35th) and innovation 
(39th)‖. The result is that the PRC has a much bigger choice of sectors to invest in as can be 
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seen from the following example; Standard Bank in financial services (Industrial and 
commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC)); Cell C in telecommunications (ZTE) and 
Huawei Technologies, and in manufacturing in South Africa by the likes of Hisense, 
Sinoprima Investment and Manufacturing South Africa, a subsidiary of Xiamen Overseas 
Chinese Electronic Co, and Hence Trade 88, in textiles (Kabemba, 2012). In line with the 
South Africa as a gateway to Africa thesis of the relationship between South Africa and the 
PRC some of these investments provide a platform for the PRC‘s involvement in the region 
and on the continent. This is an argument shared by senior Chinese diplomats as exemplified 
by the views of Zhang Xialing, deputy director-general of the foreign trade department of the 
Ministry of Commerce, at the 114th Canton Fair, which ended on Nov 4 in Guangzhou, 
Guangdong province who said that, "as the biggest economy in Africa, Chinese companies 
tend to march into South Africa as a first step in going global" (Yao Jing, 2013). The impact 
of these investments on South Africa‘s developmental challenges such as unemployment and 
poverty is uncertain. 
3.5.4 Differences in the PRC and South Africa in the context of their diplomatic 
relationship 
South Africa also has a very strong labour movement and very strong worker protection 
legislation. This results in low scores in The Global Competitiveness Report; ―labor market 
efficiency is poor (116th), hiring and firing practices are extremely rigid (147th), companies 
cannot set wages flexibly (144th), and significant tensions in labor-employer relations exist 
(148th)‖. What this belies is the fact that South Africa, notwithstanding the occasional flaring 
of protests and strikes, seems to be coping with this complex and challenging labour 
environment, something that would cripple many countries. South Africa is admired 
worldwide for its transformation from a racially, politically, economically and culturally 
divided nation to a peaceful democracy. Thus, the PRC can learn from South Africa in many 
areas that it must still address especially political liberalisation. 
The PRC and South Africa have other subtle but very important attributes. They are both 
characterised by great contrast between the haves and have not‘s. Although the PRC has 
lifted hundreds of millions of its citizens from poverty to middle-class status, the majority of 
Chinese remain very poor. The contrast between the haves and have not‘s pose significant 
political and economic risk in both countries. The rule of law and strong institutional 
framework touted by The Global Competitiveness Report make South Africa the easiest 
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African country in which to do business. Property rights, contracts and agreements are 
institutionalised rather than personal, subject to the whims of leaders, ruling elites and their 
administration, which ensures political predictability, continuity and security of investments. 
In this regard South Africa offers a much lower risk profile. For the PRC this is advantageous 
and a potential exemplar. South Africa‘s political values, to the extent that it lives up to them 
at home and abroad (Nye, 2012:153), are a source of soft power that together with its foreign 
policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority) the PRC may 
emulate. This assumes that South Africa does not itself emulate the PRC‘s political values 
and foreign policies lock, stock and barrel, a possibility given the ANC‘s close ties and 
admiration of the PRC and the Communist Party of China (Butler, 2012; The Citizen, 2011 & 
China.org.cn, 2012) 
South Africa, a constitutional democracy, and the PRC which is a self-avowed socialist state 
governed by a communist party, are an odd pair. South Africa is a young country that attained 
democratic governance only two decades ago after a protracted struggle for freedom from 
against racism, discrimination, nepotism and inequality. Its foreign policy is founded on the 
principles that seek to protect human rights, democracy, and rule of international law, 
principles that the PRC considers domestic and internal affairs. Yet they are forging strategic 
partnership that aims to promote democratisation of international relations as well as the 
construction of a multipolar world (Callahan, 2012). The quest for democracy and multiple 
political voices should surely begin at home. 
The PRC, despite its economic success, faces profound challenges, which are primarily 
institutional and political. On the other hand South Africa, which is struggling economically, 
although nascent, has a strong political framework underpinned by its Constitution, strong 
institutions and civil society exemplified by organisations such as the Treatment Action 
Campaign on HIV/AIDS, The Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance (Outa) for e-toll, Equal 
Education in education and Section 27 for human right and social justice, etc. that would 
probably not be allowed in the PRC. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a broad overview of the PRC‘s foreign policy, policies towards 
Africa and South Africa and South Africa‘s own foreign policy and relationship with the 
PRC.  
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The PRC challenges the acceptance of Western conceptualisation of international relations as 
the natural state of affairs. It does not view the West‘s approach as inherently principled or 
standard. The dominant Western Machiavellian concept of own interest and power are set 
against the Asian, and specifically Chinese, Confucian communalism and harmony. This does 
not mean that the PRC‘s foreign policy and international relations are not pragmatic and 
driven by own interests, it is. The PRC seeks to secure the natural resources that are crucial to 
its continued development and to bolster its diplomatic ties that ensure its position and stature 
in the international socio-political and economic system.  
Africa and South Africa are important to the PRC in this regard. However, the longstanding 
relationships forged during the liberation struggles against colonialism and imperialism also 
matter. Furthermore, despite the phenomenal economic growth that has propelled it into 
economic superpowerdom; the PRC remains a poor and developing country on a per capita 
basis. It has and continues to benefit from foreign direct investment of the developed nations. 
In true asymmetry theory fashion, it can learn from the developmental challenges faced by 
others as much as it can share its experience of addressing similar developmental challenges.  
In this regard, South Africa, with its successful transition, nation building, governance 
structure, and sophisticated technology and management knowhow, as well as agitation for a 
changed global order, is the ideal partner for the PRC. South Africa and other Africa 
countries need to assert their national interests in their relationship with the PRC. 
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Chapter 4 South Africa and the PRC‟s diplomatic relationship 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the motives of the diplomatic relationship between South Africa and 
the PRC. Asymmetry theory encourages the active conversion of hostility to friendship and 
routinization in forging diplomatic ties. Taking this as a point of departure, this chapter traces 
the relationship between South Africa and the PRC from its tortured origins when South 
Africa had to choose between the PRC that was governed by a communist party and Taiwan, 
its erstwhile diplomatic partner. The establishment of the diplomatic relationship between 
them did not immediately remove the legacy of South Africa‗s historical relationship with 
Taiwan which seems to have continued hanging over them requiring specific confirmation of 
its demise from the PRC.  
The texts of the different statements formalising their relationship specifically state the 
importance of South Africa‘s acceptance of the PRC‘s One China Policy and conversely, the 
PRC‘s insistence thereon. South Africa‘s attempt to maintain diplomatic ties with both the 
PRC and Taiwan, and its continued economic ties with Taiwan, remained a source of 
discomfort in the relationship for the PRC. It is a relationship that needed to be shepherded 
from possible hostility and uncertainty to a stable and secure one. 
The development of this relationship is assessed using the methods of asymmetry theory by 
quantitatively looking at trade and investment and qualitatively through their growing 
political and diplomatic interaction.  
4.2 The development of the PRC‟s partnerships with South Africa 
The new democratic South African government had to contend with the legacy of the 
country‘s relationship with Taiwan (Anthony, et al. 2013).  After extensive deliberations and 
an attempt to have relations with both, South Africa reluctantly established diplomatic 
relations with the PRC in 1998 and due to the PRC‘s ―one China policy‖; it had to break off 
its longstanding diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Geldenhuys, 1995).  
Thus, South Africa‘s diplomatic relationship with the PRC is very new and one of the least 
tested amongst African countries.  Yet, the PRC, within twelve years (1998 to 2010), elevated 
the bilateral relationship from a partnership in 2000; to a Program of Cooperation on 
Deepening the Strategic Partnership between the People's Republic of China and the 
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Republic of South Africa on 2006/06/23; a strategic partnership in 2008, and to a 
comprehensive strategic partnership in August 2010 (DIRCO and Chinese Embassy, 1998, 
2000, 2006, 2008 and 2010). This resulted in South Africa being one of a few developing 
countries such as Argentina, Cambodia, Laos, Mexico, Peru, Serbia and Vietnam, to be 
accorded a ―comprehensive strategic partnership‖ by the PRC, usually reserved for its biggest 
trading partners in the developed world (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2010, Feng Zhongping & 
Huang Jing, 2014: 18). Algeria, Belarus, Chile, Malaysia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand 
were accorded comprehensive strategic partnership after South Africa. A major developed 
country and significant trade partner compared to South Africa, such as Australia, was only 
graded a strategic partnership in 2013. This signals phenomenal progress in the relationship.  
The diplomatic relations between South Africa and the PRC was established in 1998 after 
cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan. When South Africa cut off its diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan in 1998, Taiwan was one of its most important trade and investment partners in Asia 
(Daniel, 1995; Geldenhuys, 1995; Singh, 1997 and Anthony, et al, 2013). Taiwan was then 
also economically more significant than the PRC. Therefore cutting ties with Taiwan was a 
difficult decision. While the trade and investment relations have continued with Taiwan, 
South Africa has looked to the PRC to play a critical role in its domestic socio-economic 
development by targeting more trade and investment from the PRC and opening the Chinese 
market for its businesses and their products and services. At the same time the PRC and 
South Africa are competitors both economically and politically, globally and in Africa, where 
SA has enjoyed some competitive advantage (Alves and Sidiropoulos, 2010). This indicates a 
complementary relationship. 
Holslag (2011: 369) claims that mercantilism explains the PRC‘s ties to Africa and by 
extension South Africa. He says that the PRC separates commerce from politics. He 
maintains that the PRC, departing from a highly competitive view of the global economic 
order, seeks to determine the mode of economic growth and defends national economic 
interests by political means. This offers a limited view of the motive forces in the PRC‘s 
relationship with South Africa. Although pronouncement by politicians should be interpreted 
with scepticism, Chinese President Li has said that the PRC appreciates its friendship 
between with South Africa and will seek engender consensus between the two countries 
(Zhang Qian and Liang Jun, 2013).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  62 
 
Although the PRC‘s relationship with South Africa is predictably based on its own national 
interests, it also offers scope for complementary and mutually beneficial cooperation. The 
quest for reciprocity underlies the progression of the relationship between the PRC and South 
Africa from an ordinary diplomatic relationship to a partnership, then strategic partnership 
and currently a comprehensive strategic partnership. 
4.3 Ordinary diplomatic ties (1998) 
The ordinary diplomatic relationship between SA and the PRC was established and 
formalised by the signing and issuing of the ―Joint Communiqué Between the Government of 
the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of South Africa on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 1 January 1998‖ (DIRCO and Chinese Embassy, 
1998).  This is a very short document setting the basis of the relationship. Its essence derives 
from the PRC‘s Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence and its insistence on the ―One China 
policy‖ as the basis of the relationship within the context of Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations.  
What stands out about this communiqué is its brevity and Chinese bias. Other than the 
express establishment of the relationship, it contains the basis of the relationship founded on 
―the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-
aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and 
peaceful coexistence‖ taken verbatim from the PRC‘s of the Five Principles of Mutual 
Coexistence and insistence on the ―One China policy.‖ Although the statement establishing 
the diplomatic relationship between them is called a Joint Communiqué, it is obvious that it is 
couched in the language of the PRC. 
4.4 Partnership (2000) 
According to Nkoana-Mashabane (2013) regular interactions between SA and the PRC at 
different levels intensified immediately after the establishment of diplomatic ties between 
them in 1998. President Nelson Mandela visited the PRC in 1999. The following year 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited South Africa. It was during this visit that the two 
countries signed the ―Pretoria declaration on the Partnership between the People's Republic 
of China and the Republic of South Africa‖ that established what was designated as a 
partnership. The Pretoria Declaration builds on the Joint Communiqué establishing 
diplomatic ties between SA and China, with the first paragraph restating its commitments. It 
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locates the relationship between the two countries in the context of the PRC‘s relationship 
with Africa by citing the 5 principles of Sino-African relations first put forward by Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai on his tour of ten African in the early 1960s and expanded by Chinese 
leaders since (Kong, 2003, Le Pere, 2007a).  
What defines and sets the partnership apart is in the text; the establishment of a high-level Bi-
National Commission; commitment to remove obstacles impeding negatively on their 
bilateral trade, investment, service and commercial relations; undertaking to promote the 
interests of Africa through multilateral for a such as the G-77 and the PRC, and the structures 
of the UN, and decision to support each other in efforts to create a new international political 
and economic order (Chinese Embassy, 2004; Orr 2007a; van der Merwe (2008). 
5.4 Strategic partnership (2004-2007) 
Although the partnership between South Africa and the PRC was upgraded to a strategic 
partnership in June 2004, it took a number of iterations before it was settled. It was preceded 
by the Joint Communiqué on the Second South Africa - People's Republic of China Bi-
National Commission Pretoria which sat from 28 to 29 July 2004. This was more of a 
progress report in the development of the relationship and contained no major shifts in 
existing policy. The only significant development was the agreement to intensify the 
interaction and consultation between the respective Foreign Ministries.  
 On 22 June 2006 South Africa and the PRC adopted the Programme of Co-operation on 
Deepening the Strategic Partnership, which ventured into new areas, encompassing trade, 
investment and cooperation in the fields of transportation science & technology, agricultural 
technology, IT, nanometer technology, new materials, energy, mining technology, safety, 
biotech, policies, regulations and cultural exchanges (DIRCO, 2006 & Chinese Embassy, 
2006). The essence of the strategic partnership was finally clarified by The ―Joint 
communiqué between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa‖ was 
signed on 6 February 2007‖ (DIRCO, 2007 & Chinese Embassy,  2007).  
What sets this communiqué apart is its acknowledgement and inclusion of South Africa‘s 
interests and its recognition of the role that South Africa can play beyond merely recognising 
China (mainland, Taiwan and Tibet) as a unitary state. It covers all of the ground covered by 
earlier communiqués but adds new areas that the partnership covers that are important to 
South Africa such as;  
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 South Africa actively encourages Chinese companies to seize investment 
opportunities arising from South Africa's economic growth and favourable investment 
environment and that the PRC supports South African enterprises to expand 
investment and business activities in the PRC, 
 South Africa and the PRC undertake develop their tourist trade, 
 The two countries to propose to focus on human resources development, including 
skills training, capacity building and Chinese language teaching 
 South Africa‘ role in  peacekeeping operations in the region and continent  
Looking at the text of the communiqué, although the strategic partnership moves the 
relationship forward, the PRC remains the dominant partner and its interests predominant.  
The communiqué specifically states that the government of South Africa reaffirmed its 
commitment to the one China policy, recognizing the PRC as the sole legitimate government 
representing the whole of China and Taiwan as an inalienable part of the Chinese territory. 
The PRC expressed its appreciation for this position. Furthermore, South Africa undertakes to 
actively encourage companies from the PRC to investment in it. To this end, the PRC 
undertook to use the China-Africa Development Fund to encourage Chinese companies to 
invest in South Africa. The communiqué does not provide for reciprocal arrangements for 
South Africa to invest in the PRC. The imbalances are epitomised by South Africa conceding 
and acting as a legitimiser of the ―one China policy‖ and acceding to being a source of raw 
materials and a destination for the PRC‘s manufactured goods. At this stage, the offers of 
assistance are such that they will not cost the PRC much and they will not benefit South 
Africa significantly.  
4.6 Comprehensive strategic partnership (2010) 
On 24 August 2010, during an official state visit to the PRC, President Jacob Zuma and his 
host and counterpart, Chinese President Hu Jintao signed the ―Beijing declaration on the 
establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership between the Republic of South Africa 
and the People‘s Republic of China, 24 August 2010‖ (Beijing Declaration) (South Africa, 
2010). At the time South Africa was the first developing (Wang Yong, 2012: 5) and only 
African country to sign such a declaration with the PRC and the PRC had entered into such 
partnership with only eleven other countries (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2010).  
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The declaration encompassed six memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and 38 
cooperation agreements. The Beijing Declaration builds on the earlier partnership and 
strategic partnerships agreements. The declaration clearly demonstrates very strong and 
comfortable political and economic bilateral relations the PRC and South Africa. It represents 
the most significant partnership for South Africa and amongst the most important for the PRC 
(Campbell, 2010).What differentiates the Beijing Declaration is a palpable focus on practical 
undertakings and commitments on both sides despite the residual slant on what the PRC will 
do for South Africa.   
It opens access to the PRC to undertake mineral exploration and mining but with 
beneficiation at source, it does this recognising the trade imbalances and the need to address 
them. The Beijing Declaration categorically endeavours to, 
 ―Improve, through a concerted effort, the current structure of trade between the two 
countries, in particular by working towards a more balanced trade profile and encouraging 
trade in manufactured value-added products.‖  
It provides for a joint work group to study bilateral trade discrepancies and encourage trade in 
manufactured value-added products from South Africa to the PRC. The PRC undertook to 
establish an aquaculture demonstration centre, renovate vocational training institutes and a 
number of other education and training related initiatives. The two countries also signed the 
Agreement on Scientific and Technological Co-operation to promote co-operation and 
exchanges in science and technology fields closely related to agriculture, information and 
communication, space, nano-technology and new materials, new and renewable energy, the 
environment and mining. Although earlier agreements had provided for regular interaction 
through the Bi-National Commissions of heads of state and committees, the declaration 
provides for direct annual strategic dialogue between the PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and South Africa's Department of International Relations and Co-operation, a rarity in the 
PRC‘s international relations.  
The declaration also, unusually for the PRC, opens the interaction between the countries to 
non-governmental actors by agreeing to encourage companies from both countries to explore 
co-operative opportunities in infrastructure construction projects, such as roads, railways, 
ports, power generation, airports and housing. This is in addition to the Chinese government 
and its state-owned companies‘ desire for energy and infrastructure projects. Another key 
departure from common practice is the commitment to provide mutual technical support in 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  66 
 
the areas of the "green" economy, skills development and industrial financing. It is usually 
only the PRC that undertakes to help in the development of skills and capabilities of African 
countries.  
The presence of Chinese students in South Africa already numbering over 3000 in 2006 
according to the Chinese Embassy was acknowledged. South Africa is thus not only a 
beneficiary of educational exchanges but also a benefactor in this regard for the PRC. 
Campbell (2010) points out that South Africa is the one country in Africa that can make, and 
has made, investments in the PRC, as well as receive investments from the PRC citing 
successful investments by South African investors in the PRC such as Naspers and 
SABMiller. Furthermore, South Africa has great expertise in a number of areas that the PRC 
does not such as mining (Helmreich, 2013: 16) and coal and gas to fuel conversion 
technologies, etc. Helmreich points out that South Africa is a net exporter of world-class 
mining equipment and specialist services. South Africa can even boast to be an aid donor to 
the PRC after contributing $200 000 after the catastrophic Wenchuan earthquake of 12 May 
2008 although other African countries; Algeria, Morocco (each at $1million) and Senegal 
($500 000) contributed more (Yong Chen and David Booth, 2011: 206-209). 
The comprehensive strategic partnership recognises the imbalances between the partners. 
South Africa‘s concerns about the process of de-industrialisation stemming from the influx of 
Chinese finished products and measures, to at least stem it if not reverse, it is addressed. The 
PRC committed to assist South Africa develop ―e-skills, to institute an incubation programme 
in ICT for Small Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMME) and to increase investment in 
South Africa‘s manufacturing industry and to promote the creation of value-adding activities 
in close proximity to the source of raw materials‖.Provision is made to address market access 
for South Africa goods and services to the PRC. 
The Beijing Declaration is thus the first acknowledgement of the reciprocal nature of the 
relationship between the two countries. This makes its relationship with South Africa the 
closest that the PRC has come to a relationship of equality and mutual benefit with an African 
country. 
Although the comprehensive strategic partnership between South Africa and the PRC 
provides for cooperation and bilateral defence, it does not envisage mutual security 
commitments nor exchanges involving military technologies, products and services that both 
have.  .  
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4.7 Analysing the progression of diplomatic relationship between South Africa and 
the PRC using the features of the theory of asymmetry 
This section will analyse the progression of diplomatic relationship between South Africa and 
the PRC using the features of the theory of asymmetry; focus on mutual understanding and 
appreciation of each other‘s societies and histories, active conversion of hostility to 
friendship and adroit management of a relationship drifting from friendship to hostility, 
routinization, neutralization and diplomatic ritual Womack (2006:8). 
Within the categories of routinization, neutralization and diplomatic ritual of the theory of 
asymmetry, the progression of the diplomatic relationship between South Africa and the 
PRC, despite their differences, can be analysed in quantitative terms from a macroeconomic 
and trade perspective and qualitatively from a political perspective to assess its the 
manifestation and benefit to both of them. The relationship strengthened rapidly in 
correlation with rapid macroeconomic, trade and diplomatic and political engagement. It has 
been marked by growing economic and political interaction focused on reciprocal benefits 
and cooperation in multilateral forums to realise a shared vision of the international 
governance system.  
4.7.1 Quantitative economic indicators of the development in the relationship 
The theory of asymmetry places great emphasis on broad and extensive contact between the 
societies of the countries in an asymmetrical relationship. Contact could be for individual 
purpose, business, political, cultural reasons, etc. that dispel misunderstanding and 
misconception and create affinity and closeness. Of these, economic relations, especially 
trade and investment, are the easiest to observe and track. The benefits of economic relations 
can also be quantified. 
There was minimal economic engagement between South Africa and the PRC before 
diplomatic ties were established in 1998. An examination of the profile of South Africa‘s 
global exports shown in Table 3/Figure 1 and global imports in Table 4/Figure 2, from the 
Global Trade Atlas (GTA) of the World Trade atlas, shows the growing importance of China 
as South Africa‘s trading partner although its trade with the rest of the world predominates. 
Although South Africa‘s overall trade with rest of the world has also been growing over the 
period of this study, 1998 to 2013, it is important to note that in 1998 it was already 
significant while that with the PRC was non-existent or negligible. Furthermore, Table 
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3/Figure 1 and Table 4/Figure 2 show that there is a marked increase in trade in correlation 
with the progression in the partnership between South Africa and the PRC from partnership, 
strategic partnership to the comprehensive strategic partnership. 
In 1998 the value of South Africa‘s exports to the PRC was $167 million and imports 
amounted to $779 million. Within only two years, in 2000 when they became partners, South 
Africa‘s exports to the PRC had more than doubled to $342 million and imports to South 
Africa from the PRC had grown by over 27 percent. Ten years after establishing diplomatic 
relations and eight years as partners, they formed a strategic partnership. By this time South 
Africa‘s exports to the PRC had grown to a staggering $4456 million and imports to South 
Africa from the PRC had grown to $10007 million. When, two years later, South Africa and 
the PRC upgraded their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2010, South 
Africa‘s exports to the PRC had almost doubled to $8136 million and imports to South Africa 
from the PRC had grown by over 15 percent. These figures attest to a phenomenal growth in 
their trade relations. They also indicate a growing trade deficit in favour of the PRC. 
Table 3: South Africa‟s export profile, $million and % shares 
Partner/ 
Yr. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
World 26514 28360 26126 26899 30058 26827 27031 34985 45973 51870 57898 69868 80208 62380 81311 96702 87264 
EU $m 6714 7139 7949 8744 9441 8960 8925 10977 14688 16919 18447 21061 23653 15025 19197 21333 17838 
EU% 25.3% 25.2% 30.4% 32.5% 31.4% 33.4% 33.0% 31.4% 31.9% 32.6% 31.9% 30.1% 29.5% 24.1% 23.6% 22.1% 20.4% 
Africa 
$m 
3548 4045 3450 3546 3870 3896 4066 5000 5848 7031 7444 8999 11528 10232 11735 13811 14494 
Africa 
% 
13.4% 14.3% 13.2% 13.2% 12.9% 14.5% 15.0% 14.3% 12.7% 13.6% 12.9% 12.9% 14.4% 16.4%% 14.4% 14.3% 16.6% 
China 
$m 
181 197 167 270 342 442 455 889 1020 1376 2036 3972 4456 5798 8136 11718 10126 
China 
% 
0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 1.0% 1.1% 1.6% 1.7% 2.5% 2.2% 2.7% 3.5% 5.7% 5.6% 9.3% 10.0% 12.1% 11.6% 
Source: World Trade Atlas: Global Trade Atlas (GTA) 
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Figure 1: South Africa‟s export profile, $million and % shares 
 
Source: World Trade Atlas: Global Trade Atlas (GTA), own 
 
Table 4 South Africa‟s import profile, $million and % shares 
Partner
/ 
Yr. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
World 26364 27720 25998 24067 26916 25127 26205 34400 47653 55029 68157 79924 91059 64867 80212 10000
8 
10155
8 
EU $m 11793 11817 11610 10369 10864 10455 11138 14885 19365 21018 23705 26903 28515 20842 25731 30712 29182 
EU% 44.7% 42.6% 44.7% 43.1% 40.4% 41.6% 42.5% 43.3% 40.6% 38.2% 34.8% 33.7% 31.3% 32.1% 32.1% 30,7% 28.7% 
Africa 
$m 
662 920 734 860 857 850 1070 1264 2181 2826 4640 6295 8798 5258 6251 7655 10019 
Africa 
% 
2,4% 3.3.% 2,8% 3,6% 3.2% 3.4% 4.1% 3.7% 4.6% 5.1% 6.8% 7.9% 9.7% 8.1% 7.8% 7.7% 9.9% 
China 
$m 
553 690 779 819 993 1053 1365 2225 3591 4926 6819 8586 10007 8494 11535 14120 14592 
China 
% 
2.1% 2.5% 3.0% 3.4% 3.7% 4,2% 5,2% 6.5% 7.5% 9.0% 10.0% 10.7% 11.0% 13.1% 14.4% 14.1% 14.4% 
Source: World Trade Atlas: Global Trade Atlas (GTA) 
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Figure 2: South Africa‘s import profile, $million and % shares 
 
Source: World Trade Atlas: Global Trade Atlas (GTA), own 
Sandrey, Mpitsa, Vermaak & de Beer (2013) attribute the fast growth in trade between the 
two countries to raw materials exports from South Africa to the PRC and finished 
manufactured goods imported from the PRC to South Africa. Sandrey et al (2013: 4) 
highlight the importance of the PRC to South Africa and the fact that South Africa is not 
conversely that important to the PRC. This draws attention to the growth in their relationship 
despite the asymmetry. Figure 3 shows a strong correlation between trade and the progression 
of the relationship to ―higher levels‖ of partnership, even though this cannot be adjudged as 
causation. The reliability and validity of the correlation is supported by the absence of a 
proportionate strengthening of trade between South Africa and its other trading partners such 
as the EU, the rest of Africa and the rest of the world as the associated amounts and 
percentage shares in Table 3/Figure 1 and Table 4/Figure 2 shows. 
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Figure 3: Trade between South Africa and the PRC and progression of their 
partnership 
 
Source: World Trade Atlas: Global Trade Atlas (GTA), own 
In Figure 4, Mazibuko (2010:12) shows the relationship between exports and imports 
between South Africa to the PRC for the years 2006 to 2011, which is the period within 
which the diplomatic relations progressed from a strategic partnership to a comprehensive 
strategic partnership. 
Figure 4: Trade balance between South Africa and the PRC 
 
Source: Mazibuko (2010:12) 
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Investment flows between South Africa and the PRC show similar growth to the trade figures  
Gelb (2010: 3) has conducted a study of the impact of foreign direct investment between 
South Africa and the PRC. Chinese investments in SA has grown strongly, with the largest 
investment being the one made by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
when it purchased a 20% stake in Standard Bank for about R55 billion.  Table7 shows that 
apart from this significant investment, Chinese investment in South Africa has focused on an 
increasingly diversified portfolio. Table 5 shows that investments in the PRC by companies 
based in or linked to South Africa are estimated at between $600m and $800m. South Africa 
is the only African country to have a significant investment presence in the PRC. Of course, 
many of these companies while South African in origin, may now have their primary listing 
in London and elsewhere. 
Although Gelb (2010) cautions against taking the quantitative data on the FDI between South 
Africa and the PRC at face value because they are disparate, inconsistent and mostly of 
unknown origin, they provide a credible indicator of the underlying trends. The most credible 
is that in Table 5 derived from UNCTAD (2007). Nonetheless Table 5 and 6 show a growing 
trend in FDI between them. 
Table 5: Estimates in the literature for Chinese FDI in SA  
 
Source: Gelb (2010:3) 
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Table 6: Estimates in the literature for SA FDI in the PRC: 
 
Source: Gelb (2010: 3) 
Shelton (2012:13) bemoans the fact that the growing trend in Chinese FDI in South Africa is 
focused on the mining sector. Nonetheless, the size of the investment by ICBC in the 
Standard Bank was a significant departure from the focus on raw materials (see Table7).The 
PRC is diversifying its investments in South Africa to manufacturing and property 
development. In August  2013, Perfect (China) which makes health foods and personal care 
products, bought the Val de Vie estate in the Western Cape, the first Chinese investment in 
South Africa‘s wine industry, targeting wine exports to China and East Asia (Phakathi, 2013). 
In November 2013 a PRC property company, Shanghai Zendai, bought 1,600 hectares for 
R1.06 billion in Modderfontein, Johannesburg, and plans to develop a R84 billion mixed-use 
project including residential, commercial, light industrial and retail (Steyn, 2013).  These 
illustrate a broadening and deepening of investments between South Africa and the PRC. 
Table 7: Chinese – South African investments 
Date Chinese company SA company/ 
partners 
Type of business Value ($) 
1996 Sinosteel ASA metals Ferrochrome 
mine 
 
October 2006 Minmetals Palabora mining Iron ore mining 3 year off-take 
agreement 190 
million 
December 2006 Sinosteel Samancor Chrome Chrome mine and 
processing 
200million 
September 2007 Minmetals Mission point- Chrome 6.5 million 
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Vesatex prospecting rights 
July 2007 Jisco International Ferro 
Metals 
Ferrochrome 
producer 
50% off-take 
agreement 
February 2008 Industrial 
Commercial 
Bank of China  
Standard bank Banking  5.5 billion 
April 2009 Minmetals Vizirama Exploration rights  
May 2009 Shenzen Media Telkom Media Television 
Broadcasting 
 
September 2009 China North 
Industries 
Pietermaritzburg 
truck assembly 
plant (super Group) 
Automotive  
May 2010 Jinchuan Wesizwe Platinum Platinum Mining 877 million 
June 2010 Yingli Green 
Energy 
Mulilo Energy Solar from joint 
venture 
40 million 
Source: Financial Mail, 9 July 2010, p. 34 
The trade and investment relationship between South Africa and the PRC has grown 
significantly since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1998 and has strengthened as it was 
upgraded to partnership in 200, strategic partnership (2008) and to comprehensive strategic 
partnership in 2010. The PRC became South Africa‘s biggest trading partner in 2009 when 
total trade was only US$14.1 billion (Gelb, 2010). The volume of trade between South Africa 
and the PRC reached $210bn in 2013 and the aim is to double this to $400bn within the next 
six years (Kotch, 2014). 
 According to Gelb (2010), the fact that the PRC became South Africa‘s biggest trading 
partner in 2009 is important, however even more significant is the impact that this has had on 
them. Trade and investment between them is not equally significant.  South Africa has 
economically gained relatively more, directly and indirectly, from investments from the PRC 
and access to the Chinese market. This underscores the fact that the PRC is significantly 
important for South Africa, than South Africa is to the PRC. Asymmetry theory predicts the 
dependence of the smaller partner on the larger one in asymmetric relations.  
4.7.2 Political and diplomatic indicators of the development in the relationship 
Diplomatic ties between South Africa and the PRC were established in 1998. Before this 
there was minimal interaction between the apartheid government and the PRC which is 
governed by a communist party due to the former‘s strong anti-communist stance and strong 
ties with Taiwan. However, the PRC provided support to the liberation movements amongst 
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which was the SACP which is a part of the post-apartheid government through its alliance 
with the ANC (Geldenhuys, 1995). However, post 1994 South Africa remained ambivalent in 
its relationship with the PRC. This ambivalence was not only marked by the continued 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan but also by the hosting the PRC‘s nemesis, the Dalai Lama in 
1996. Once diplomatic ties were established, South Africa and the PRC increased the use of 
diplomatic and political activity. In terms of the mechanisms that asymmetry theory espouses, 
this is in line with the expectation of the need for deliberate active conversion of a tenuous 
relationship to a friendlier one.  
In their relationship, South Africa and the PRC routinely make use of the other features of 
asymmetry theory such as routinization, neutralization and diplomatic ritual extensively.   
After diplomatic relations were established in 1998, it was important to cement the 
relationship through routinization and diplomatic ritual through reciprocal state visits during 
which the two accorded their respective leaders the necessary pageantry and protocol. 
President Nelson Mandela became the first South African head of state to undertake an 
official state visit to the PRC in May 1999 (Shelton, 2012). Uncharacteristically, while there, 
President Mandela eschewed highlighting human rights issues and focused on promoting 
bilateral trade and investment. A year later, in April 2000, President Jiang Zemin paid a state 
visit to South Africa, also a first for a Chinese head of state.  On this occasion, President 
Jiang Zemin and President Thabo Mbeki, who had replaced president Mandela in the 
meantime, signed the ‗Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership Between the People‘s Republic 
of the PRC and the Republic of South Africa‘ that committed both countries to a ‗spirit of 
partnership and constructive dialogue‘, united in the ‗moral imperative for developing 
countries to strengthen capacity for co-operation and mutual support in the international 
system‘ (Chinese Embassy, 2004).  
Shelton (2012) argues that the most important outcome of the agreement was the 
establishment of a bi-national commission (BNC). The BNC would meet regularly to guide 
and co-ordinate all government-to-government relations between the PRC and South Africa, 
and provide an effective consultative forum for bilateral and multilateral matters of mutual 
interest. The Pretoria Declaration committed the PRC and South Africa to a ‗constructive 
dialogue‘, a concerted effort to expand economic links and a joint initiative to advance, 
peace, security and development on the African continent. The BNC was the first vehicle of 
routinization between them filling the gap in the period between the high level engagements 
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at the presidential and vice presidential level. Other mechanisms such as the sectoral 
committees and the Mechanism of Strategic Dialogue augment and complement the BNC in 
the routinization process. 
President Mbeki paid a state visit to the PRC in December 2001 during which the BNC was 
officially launched. The focus of the visit was to expand relations, including scientific and 
nuclear research, as South Africa was looking to the PRC for trade and investment. Shelton 
(2012), again, maintains that Presidents Mbeki and Jiang Zemin also identified the common 
foreign policy objective of the partnership to include advancing a new global order. In this 
context, South Africa looks to the PRC for support in the areas of the reform of the 
multilateral institutions and the global trading and governance system, especially the IMF, 
World Bank and UNSC. This commitment would come to the fore when South Africa was 
lobbying to become a non-permanent member of the UNSC and later for membership of the 
then BRIC (Seria, 2010). The PRC championed South Africa‘s membership of the UNSC and 
invited it to the BRIC when it chaired it. 
The reciprocal state visits by the respective heads of state were followed by reciprocal visits 
by the two countries‘ respective deputy heads of state are also indications of diplomatic ritual 
in asymmetry theory. Mr Zeng Qinghong, Vice President of the People's Republic of China, 
paid an official visit to his South African counterpart, Deputy President Jacob Zuma, between 
26 and 29 June 2004 (DFA, 2004). This coincided with the second South Africa - People's 
Republic of China Bi-National Commission Pretoria, held on 28 - 29 July 2004, which they 
co-chaired. Vice President Qinghong also paid courtesy calls on President Mbeki, Ms Baleka 
Mbete, the Speaker of the National Assembly and Ms Joyce Kgoali, the Chairperson of the 
National Council of Provinces. Although the two countries expressed satisfaction with the 
progress in their relationship, attested to by the 
―comprehensive nature and growing number of exchanges, especially in areas of trade, investment, 
culture, education, science and technology and international affairs, which have deepened, 
strengthened and diversified the South Africa - China strategic partnership during the past two years‖ 
(DFA, 2004), 
 The communiqué ends by reiterating South Africa‘s commitment to the One China Policy, 
betraying the residual uncertainty that the PRC had in this regard, and the significance it 
attaches thereto. The exclusion of specific mention thereof indicates that by the Third BNC it 
was deemed no longer necessary for South Africa to reiterate allegiance to the PRC and 
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rejection of Taiwan. This could be a sign of a growing trust relationship between the two 
countries, marking the dissipation of hostility in terms of asymmetry theory. The use of 
inclusive rhetoric and references to the ―deepened‖ and ―strengthened‖ partnership are the 
signs of what asymmetry describes as neutralization and diplomatic ritual. In the quest for 
mutual understanding and appreciation of each other‘s societies and histories, the PRC 
attracts and supports young Africans to study in the PRC. There has also been a rising 
number of Chinese students who choose to study in tertiary institutions in South Africa. 
Traditionally tertiary institutions in the United States of America and Europe were preferred. 
This contrasts with the PRC sending most young Chinese as volunteers rather than students to 
the rest of Africa. This attests to the PRC‘s recognition of the quality of tertiary education in 
South Africa and associated technical and managerial capabilities. The aim of these 
initiatives is to promote mutual understanding between the two countries and to strengthen 
the human foundation of their partnership. 
In June 2006, President Mbeki and Premier Wen Jiabao signed an agreement to help protect 
the South African textile industry from the influx of low-cost Chinese textiles (van Eeden & 
Fundira, 2008). In so doing, the PRC signalled its willingness to assist South Africa in 
alleviating the impact of their asymmetric trade relations and a global trend whereby the PRC 
became a global manufacturing centre. In so doing, Shelton (2012) argues,  the PRC agreed 
to a more equitable, ‗win-win‘ relationship to tackle the overall trade imbalance by increasing 
the value of South Africa‘s exports to the PRC, focussing on mineral beneficiation and the 
export of manufactured and processed agricultural products. One of the initiatives undertaken 
by the PRC to facilitate this was the establishment of the $5 billion China-Africa 
Development Fund (CADF) at the Beijing summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) by President Hu Jintao on November 4, 2006. CADF‘s only office in Africa would 
later be opened in South Africa (Campbell, 2009). At the same time South African 
investment in the PRC also increased as South African companies such SAB-Miller, Anglo-
American and Kumba Resources entered the Chinese market (Alden, 2008). These are 
illustrations of the use of neutralization whereby the PRC accepts an intervention to 
neutralize a situation that could lead to serious disagreement and conflict in a nascent 
relationship. Although this action was short-lived and benefited the PRC in the long run, with 
Chinese textiles having displaced South African textiles since, it was a great symbolic 
gesture. It provided South Africa an opportunity to revel at having extracted what it believed 
to be a significant concession from the PRC. On the other hand, the PRC could claim to have 
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listened to the pleas of its partner even if this was at a cost to itself. The reality as can be seen 
in Tables 3/Figure 1 and 4/Figure 2 is that total trade between them was insignificant. This 
highlights the insignificance of the PRC‘s textile exports to South Africa and the symbolic 
nature of the agreement. Neutralization appears to have worked as asymmetry theory would 
predict. Another aspect of the relationship that is characterised by neutralization is the saga 
involving South Africa‘s hesitation in granting a visa to the Dalai Lama.   
Asymmetry theory predicts that states in an asymmetric relationship will avoid actions and 
behaviours that may be taken as an affront to the other. A key feature of the relationship 
between South Africa and the PRC is the former‘s acceptance of the One China Policy. 
Accepting the One China Policy implies the rejection of the fragmentation of China. The 
PRC considers itself to be China and Taiwan and Tibet as its own. It waits the 
reincorporation of Taiwan to the PRC and resists calls for autonomy for Uighur and Tibet and 
considers those making the calls hostile. Before relinquishing his political role, the Dalai 
Lama advocated for the autonomy of Tibet raising the ire of the PRC. Neutralisation 
envisages that given this antagonism of the PRC towards him, South Africa will desist from 
any action that may be misconstrued as an affront to the PRC‘s status, given its hostility 
towards the Dalai Lama. Asymmetry theory helps to explain why South Africa does not have 
to take any instructions from the PRC as is often insinuated. The relationship between 
partners is predicated on them being able to depend and rely on each other without specific 
demands or instructions. Partners desist from actions or behaviours that are contrary to this.  
Conversely, they display, pursue and reinforce actions or behaviours that signal dependability 
and reliability. 
Alden (2008) argues that on taking up the non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 
2006, South Africa‘s positions on matters like Darfur, Zimbabwe and Burma (Myanmar) 
mirrored those of the PRC and are a clear indication of the two governments‘ shared outlook 
on the key features of the international system as outlined in the 2000 partnership agreement. 
On the other hand Kornegay (2012) indicates that South Africa stance in this regard was 
possibly a principled one seeking to avoid UNSC ‗mission creep‘ on a matter that should 
have been dealt with by the appropriate UN agency; The UN Human Rights Council. The 
coincidental alignment of their positions should not be misconstrued as kowtowing to the 
PRC. South Africa is often than not guided by its own foreign policy stance. The 
conventional perspective that South Africa genuflects to the PRC aligns to the interpretations 
of mainstream international relations theories such as realism and liberalism that emphasise 
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competition and dominance. From this perspective, the PRC as the larger partner, lords it 
over South Africa which is much smaller.  Asymmetry theory provides interpretation based 
on complementarity and cooperation and the principles of routinization, neutralization and 
diplomatic ritual. 
Diplomatic ritual has been apparent in the presidential, Ministerial and diplomatic exchanges 
between them. In September 2007 Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and Vice 
President Zeng Qinghong co-chaired the Third Session of the Bi-National Commission in 
Beijing. As Orr (2007a: 4) has highlighted, the most important aspect of this session as stated 
in the communiqué was to seek mutual benefit by ―taking advantage of South Africa's rich 
resources base and China's dynamic growth, (both sides) will work for a Partnership for 
Growth and Development with the aim of establishing a structured and predictable 
framework for evolving complementarities into higher value added trade and investment 
sectors‖. The focus on reciprocity is apparent. 
The high level engagements at the presidential and vice presidential level were augmented by 
those between their respective foreign affairs departments and the sectoral committees, 
respectively on diplomatic affairs, trade, education, science and technology, and defence, 
leading to the signature of many agreements covering a wide range of political, social and 
economic issues. Furthermore, the increasing diplomatic and political engagements led to a 
tangible rise in trade and investment as shown in Tables 3 to 7.  This period saw the single 
largest Chinese investment in Africa when the Industrial Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
acquired a 20% stake in Standard Bank for $5.5 billion (Orr, 2007 & Alden, 2008). This 
growing political and economic engagement culminated in the relationship being upgraded to 
a strategic partnership in 2008. Since then, the PRC has become South Africa's biggest trade 
and investment partner and vice versa in Africa (Ensor, 2014) (also see Tables 3 to 7 and 
Figures 3 and 4).  
On the political front, the Mechanism of Strategic Dialogue was established in 2008 to 
enhance discussions and exchanges in the period between the BNC meetings (DIRCO, 2009). 
The resultant deepening of the relationship led to the establishment of the comprehensive 
strategic partnership between South Africa and the PRC in August 2010. This has enhanced 
the relationship further. 
 As already indicated the PRC, in its capacity as rotating chairperson of the BRIC, invited 
South Africa to be a member to form BRICS despite widespread scepticism on the merits of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  80 
 
its suitability to join this formation. South Africa has since hosted a BRICS summit in March 
2013 and will host the FOCAC summit in 2015.  
South Africa‘s growing diplomatic affinity with the PRC has increased the perception that it 
is currying favour (Kornegay, 2012. The South Africa‘s government faced opprobrium for 
dithering to grant the Dalai Lama a visa until he decided not to visit. This was interpreted as a 
move designed to maintain good relations with the PRC, especially given the fact that he had 
earlier been allowed to visit  South Africa three times; in 1996, 1999 and 2004 (Lieberman, 
2013). This view is supported by Draper (2011:210) who contends that some of South 
Africa‘s actions, for example the delay in granting a visa for the Dalai Lama to attend 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu‘s 80th birthday seeks to ingratiate it to the PRC which  makes it 
―China‘s stooge.‖  There is hardly any recognition or acknowledgement that South Africa‘s 
actions are in tune with its foreign policy and adhere to its commitments. For instance, by 
subscribing to the One China Policy, it recognises China as a unitary state, encompassing not 
just Taiwan, but any region that seeks independence or autonomy from the PRC, including 
Tibet and Uighur. 
 Initiatives and efforts to enhance the comprehensive strategic partnership continue especially 
with regard bilateral trade and investment. As Ensor (2014) points out over 90% of South 
Africa‘s top 10 exports to the PRC are in raw materials while 100% of our top 10 imports 
from the PRC are manufactured products. South Africa and the PRC are now focused on 
working together to promote value-added exports to the PRC; and to increase inward 
investment from the PRC. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has followed the development of the relationship between South Africa and the 
PRC. It set out the specific moments of change and the distinguishing parameters of each 
phase of the relationship and the consequences and impact they had economically, politically 
and diplomatically.   The theory of asymmetry was used to analyse this development.  The 
analysis shows a strong correlation between the features of asymmetry theory and the 
development of the relationship between them. At the early stages of the relationship the 
focus was on building mutual understanding and appreciation of each other‘s societies and 
histories and the active conversion of tenuous relationship to a friendlier one. This was 
achieved primarily through routinization and diplomatic ritual associated with reciprocal 
visits by heads of state and their deputies and the creation of special mechanisms such as the 
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BNC, special committees and Mechanism of Strategic Dialogue. When the influx of Chinese 
textiles into South Africa threatened the relationship, neutralization was employed to diffuse 
the tension potential disagreement and conflict that it could have caused.   
The progression of the relationship between South Africa and the PRC from an ordinary 
diplomatic relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership with a short period of time is 
an indication of growing level of trust and confidence between them. It has led to overtures 
towards growing reciprocity between them. 
The improvement in the partnership has allowed the PRC to undertake to improve access to 
its domestic market in the same way that it enjoys access to the South African domestic 
market (Gelb, 2010). Nonetheless, the trade imbalance between them continues. Asymmetry 
theory emphasises the importance of the smaller state taking the initiative in its relationship 
with a larger state. This has not always been the case in South Africa‘s relationship with the 
PRC, although the Beijing Declaration points to a move to focus in addressing the imbalances 
in the relationship).    It remain dominated the exports of raw material from South Africa to 
the PRC and important of manufactured goods from the PRC.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this final chapter is to summarise and bring together the different aspects and 
findings of this study. It starts by revisiting the research questions.  It employs asymmetry 
theory to examine the attributes that contribute most to the progression of the relationship 
between South Africa and the PRC and the PRC‘s preference to conduct it through 
partnership.  
The main research question of this study was; what underpins and motivates the nature, scope 
and development of the relationship between South Africa and the PRC since the 
establishment of diplomatic ties in 1998 to 2013?  
The main question was broken down into four secondary questions; 
 What are the roots of the relationship?  
 How has the relationship developed?   
 What are the prospects of the relationship?  
 Is asymmetry theory a useful framework to explore these questions? 
Asymmetry theory was used to get insight into what underpins and motivates the nature, 
scope and development of relationship between South Africa and the PRC since the 
establishment of diplomatic ties. The thesis has shown that asymmetry theory is a suitable 
and useful theoretical framework in this regard. With regard to the future of the diplomatic 
relationship, reference to its core principles such as complementarity assists in drawing a 
trajectory of the development and possible drivers thereof. The findings of the thesis imply a 
diplomatic relationship between South Africa and the PRC  that is based on more than just 
the latter‘s resource needs and diplomatic support in the international system.  
5.2 Employing asymmetry theory to elicit what motivates, guide the progression of 
partnership between South Africa and the PRC and how this is managed 
The empirical evidence presented in chapter 4 supports the assumption that the theory of 
asymmetry is applicable to how South Africa and the PRC manage their partnership and 
elicits what motivates, guide the progression.  The concluding sections below employs the 
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principles of asymmetry theory to do so; complementarity and cooperation, mutual 
understanding and appreciation of each other‘s societies and histories, actively convert 
hostility to friendship and adroitly manage the relationship to prevent it drifting from 
friendship to hostility, as well as using what Womack calls routinization, neutralization and 
diplomatic ritual. 
5.2.1 Histories and societies 
Chapter 3 showed that the histories of South Africa and the PRC, and the history of their 
relationship, play important roles in their respective foreign relations and policies in general, 
and in particular, with regard to each other.  
Asymmetry theory predicts that in the relationship between smaller and larger states, both 
will pay special attention to advancing mutual understanding and appreciation of each other‘s 
societies and histories. They do this by increasing the opportunities for general contact 
between their peoples using different avenues such as, business, educational, cultural 
exchanges, etc. that exposes their respective people to each other and dispel extreme 
stereotypes, misconceptions and distrust. The role of growing positive people-to-people 
relations between South Africa and the PRC and the stabilising impact in their relationship 
should not be underestimated. The growing native Chinese population in South Africa and 
many young South Africans who are taking the opportunity to study in the PRC will play an 
important role in this regard. 
The history the PRC and the fact that it remains a low income developing country despite its 
phenomenal economic growth in recent times predispose its foreign policy toward co-
operation especially with other developing countries, in particular African countries.  This co-
operation is predicated on the PRC‘s appreciation of the reality and value of complementary 
endowments and capabilities of states; large and or small. This is the essence of the 
asymmetry theory whose central insight is that co-operation may be a rational, self-interested 
strategy for countries to pursue under certain conditions (Keohane, 1969). 
The relationship between South Africa and the PRC did not begin on a good note as South 
Africa, contrary to its preference, had to accept the PRC‘s One China policy and break 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan as a condition of establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC. As 
asymmetry theory would aver, there has been concerted effort to convert the resultant tension 
and hostility to an enduring friendship. The rhetoric of the different statements and 
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communiqués in Chapter 4 attest to this. South Africa‘s choice of the PRC over Taiwan 
remains very important in their relationship. 
5.2.2 Routinization 
It was necessary earlier on to convert any residual tensions and hostility into the friendship 
and partnership that has come to characterise the relationship between South Africa and the 
PRC. This is achieved by creating opportunities for regular contact and discussions amongst 
the decision makers and influencers to discuss mutually defined important topics. This 
intended to build understanding and trust and to reduce the potential for misperception and 
misunderstanding. Where misperceptions and misunderstandings arise, they can be addressed 
before they fester. This process is routinization in the terminology of asymmetry theory. 
As indicated in chapter 4 high level engagements at the presidential and vice presidential 
level are the main mechanism that South Africa and the PRC use to normalise their 
relationship. However, they established the BNC one of the vehicles to do this. This was 
believed not to be enough and other mechanism such as the sectoral committees and the 
Mechanism of Strategic Dialogue augment and complement the high level engagements and 
the BNC in the interim characteristic of a routinization process using Womack‘s terminology. 
Routinization requires reciprocity and flexibility that may not always be met by the legalistic 
nature of alliances and bilateral treaties. For this reason the use of partnership affords the 
partners time to build understanding and trust and progress with a growing level of mutual 
trust and confidence. 
The PRC has shown the most preference and inclination for partnerships that offer it 
flexibility in how it engages with other countries. 
5.2.3 Diplomatic ritual 
There has been a large number of high level diplomatic exchanges between South Africa and 
the PRC since establishing diplomatic ties. All the presidents and vice presidents of the two 
countries have exchanged reciprocal visits since 1998 as has the ministers of their respective 
foreign relations departments and other government departments. There have also been 
reciprocal interparty visits between the ANC (and SAPC) and CPC. This is unprecedented for 
the CPC which eschews contact with external entities. 
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In accordance with diplomatic ritual, during these visits the parties accord each other the 
appropriate fanfare, pageantry and protocol as well as what may be seen as pedantic common 
courtesies. Furthermore, these reciprocal visits are marked by joint statements celebrating the 
relationship and pronouncements of its importance and the stability, mutual respect and 
continued commitment and valuing of the relationship. This is important rhetoric that 
asymmetry foresees. 
5.2.4 Neutralization 
Neutralization goes hand in hand with routinization.  In Womack‘s terminology, 
neutralization seeks to neutralise situations that may lead to serious disagreement or conflict. 
Neutralization starts with situating problems or challenging situations in the framework of the 
friendly relationship and common interest. These challenges are then taken out of the realm 
of regular diplomatic interaction and referred to expert committees or commissions to address 
and resolve. Neutralization has been used extensively in the relationship between South 
Africa and the PRC; however the most visible examples of this are how they have 
respectively dealt with the 2006 textile agreement and the visa applications by the Dalai 
Lama. As already mentioned in chapter 4, partners must be able to depend and rely on each 
other. 
The study has recognised that there is a need to look at the relationship between South Africa 
and the PRC differently.  Asymmetry theory presents a fresh template for interpretation to 
understand their relationship. Leadership a fundamental aspect in managing asymmetric 
relationships because asymmetry is not a problem to be solved but a situation to be managed 
(Firsing, 2010).  
5.2.5 Complementarity and cooperation 
The overarching perspective of asymmetry is the recognition that the world comprises 
countries of different sizes, strengths and capacities on different dimensions that they can use 
to maximise their national interests. It posits that these differences engender complementarity 
and cooperation. It does not deny the role of competition but contextualises it. There are 
many areas in South Africa and the PRC‘s relationship that can serve as the basis of 
complementarity and cooperation. 
South Africa and the PRC are similar in many ways despite their size differences. They both 
have the characteristics of both a developed and developing country. Despite the PRC‘s 
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success in lifting millions of its people out of poverty in the last three decades, poverty and 
raising inequality remain endemic in the two countries. They face a yawning divide between 
the rich and poor that presents a great risk to socio-political stability. They can thus learn 
from each other. Counter intuitively, this applies more to the PRC in this regard; 
 South Africa  can be a model of cross-cultural integration for a country challenged by 
secessionist calls from Tibet and  Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous regions and over fifty 
cultural restive minorities 
 South Africa ‗s international activism, especially in multilateral and global 
governance structures where it is punches above its weight 
 For a country its size, it enjoys an enviable international stature. It owes this to soft 
power rather than hard power 
South Africa cannot counterbalance the PRC directly due to the asymmetry between them on 
many dimensions. Therefore it should focus on leveraging its partnership with the PRC. To 
do so effectively it needs to have a better understanding of the reasons and import of the 
partnership to the PRC. Wang Yong (2012: 8) points out that while the PRC has been more 
cautious and moderate; South Africa has been more vocal and strident in challenging the 
Western-dominated international order with minimal repercussions which the PRC attributes 
to the West‘s sensitivity to the criticism from Africa, owing to either a sense of guilt over its 
colonial history or residual ―patriarchal‘ responsibility‖. In serving its own purposes, South 
Africa may be serving those of the PRC too. 
The relationship between South Africa and the PRC is currently framed predominately from 
the perspective of the PRC. South Africa is important to the PRC for more reasons that the 
hackneyed resources and diplomacy rationale. The other key factors, less articulated and 
hyped, that make it attractive as a partner for the PRC are; 
 Technological and managerial knowhow (especially in a pluralistic environment)  
 Geographic location with regard to maritime trade, naval defence and as a logistical 
gateway 
 Governance in a pluralistic society that increasingly is exposed to more information 
and different places 
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There is concern whether the alignment of South Africa‗s stance with the PRC on a number 
of issues in the international relations arena, for example, at the UNSC, results in it being a 
coincidental proxy or useful innocent. In pursuing its foreign policy, South Africa helps the 
PRC achieve its own foreign policy objectives. In a multipolar world, it is in the PRC‘s 
interest for South Africa to be a regional superpower 
Asymmetry theory envisages a situation where a junior partner in an asymmetric relation 
takes the lead in managing it. In this regard, it is incumbent on South African policy-makers 
to ensure that: 
 Agreements, memorandum of understanding, communiqués, etc., do not contain 
vague provisions that can be subject to discretionary interpretation by the partners. 
The PRC offers commitments, data and information that it verifies from its own 
perspective. They should endeavour to seek and agree a common language and 
understanding of commitments and how they will be monitored and progress 
assessed. 
 It and its enterprises are treated fairly by the PRC and in the PRC, especially given 
the different ideological differences and how these dictate the property rights and 
laws, legal, institutional, operational, etc., environments. Otherwise the PRC and 
Chinese enterprises will have the advantage of being treated according to domestic 
laws, regulations and practice while  it and its enterprises are curtailed by Chinese 
domestic laws, regulations and practice that the act as a barrier. 
 The PRC realises and addresses the challenges of working with a hybrid command 
and free-market economy with ownership limits and restrictions, challenging entry 
barriers for foreign enterprises, restrictions on the employment of foreigners, etc. 
6.3 The contribution of asymmetry theory to the study of international relations 
As pointed out in chapter 2, asymmetry theory arose out of Womack‘s study and insights of 
the relationship between the PRC and a number of its smaller Asian neighbours. Although 
scholars such as Keohane had studied and written about the relationship between larger and 
smaller state, Womack recognised the inherent imbalance amongst states and the impact this 
has as a positive attribute rather than a benign or negative as the mainstream theories of 
international studies would predict.   
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Womack‘s studies of the relationship between the PRC and countries such as Vietnam and 
Cambodia led to the conclusion that the great capacity disparities between these countries 
created an asymmetric framework for the relationship that shaped every aspect and every 
phase and was therefore key in studying them. There is a symbiotic relationship between the 
PRC and its neighbours. Their asymmetric endowments are a positive attribute of the 
relationship.   
This suggested asymmetry as a possible framework for assessing foreign relations and 
policies in the international political arena in a time where most international relationships 
are asymmetric, including that between South Africa and the PRC.  
Womack‘s assumption that most asymmetric relationships are a result of complementarity 
and cooperation between the partners irrespective of their size has currency. Womack 
postulated that it is not the asymmetry that is important but how it is managed. He advanced a 
number of ways to manage asymmetric relationships. These are; focusing on mutual 
understanding and appreciation of each other‘s societies and histories, actively converting 
hostility to friendship and adroit management of a relationship drifting from friendship to 
hostility, routinization, neutralization and diplomatic ritual.  
This terminology and methodology may not be uniquely and entirely Womack‘s in the study 
of international relations, but used together, they present an alternative template to examine 
and understand it. Applying it to other asymmetric relationships as this study has done 
contribute to a nuanced understanding of international relations and the growing trend of 
relating through partnerships with the PRC leading in this regard. 
5.4 Suggestions for future research 
This study was prompted by a desire to understand the reasons for the phenomenal 
progression of the diplomatic relationship between South Africa and the PRC given their 
asymmetry, and the role of its designation as upgradable partnerships in this development. 
The study focused on using symmetry theory to examine and analyse this. 
It has contributed to the international relations literature through identifying how asymmetric 
theory can facilitate analysis of partnerships and their growing role in the international 
system by focusing on the partnerships between South Africa and the PRC. 
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There is a lack of research exploring the partnership between South Africa and the PRC 
similar to Womack studies of the relationship between the PRC and a number of its smaller 
Asian neighbours mean that the current study and future studies utilising symmetry theory in 
this way will contribute to further understanding the nature of these partnership. 
It would be interesting to carry out a comparative study of the factors that influence and 
motivates the PRC‗s asymmetric partnerships with its neighbours and South Africa.   
An advanced study of asymmetry theory can contribute to its understanding and validation 
because it remains a marginal theory in the study of international relations. This would make 
it an important tool in the repertoire of theories of international relations.  
 Although the PRC has popularised the use of partnerships as a toll of diplomatic relations, 
partnerships remain ill-defined and amorphous. Therefore partnerships in the context of 
international relations warrant more study and research. 
5.5 Conclusion  
The study has assessed the nature and scope of the relationship between South Africa and the 
PRC and the motives that underpin it, using asymmetry theory as a framework of analysis. 
The study has aimed to fill a gap in the current literature on the relationship between South 
Africa and the PRC by looking at it as a continuum and using asymmetry theory as an 
alternative frame work of understanding its development from an ordinary diplomatic tie in 
1998 to the current comprehensive strategic partnership. A comprehensive military exchange 
package may be the basis for the upgraded for the comprehensive strategic partnership in the 
future. 
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